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Abstract 
To Destroy or to Preserve: Urban Renewal and the Legal Foundation of Historic District Zoning 
By: Andrew Eugene Tarne, J.D., B.A. 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Urban 
and Regional Planning at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2014. 
Major Director: Dr. I-Shian Suen, Chair, Urban and Regional Studies 
 
Historic preservation and urban renewal are often thought to be polar opposites. Where 
one seeks to preserve, the other generally seeks to destroy in order to rebuild. While the 
programs appear on the surface to be in opposition, this Thesis seeks to demonstrate that there is 
a fundamental connection between the underlying legal principles of historic zoning and urban 
renewal. To that end, the jurisprudence involving historic zoning and aesthetic regulations before 
and after the seminal urban renewal case of Berman v. Parker has been collected and analyzed.  
This analysis revealed that courts were hesitant to support aesthetic, and by extension 
would have been unlikely to support historic zoning, prior to the Supreme Court’s validation of 
urban renewal programs in Berman. For example, in 1949 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
stated that specifically stated that a zoning regulation cannot be enacted solely to preserve the 
beauty of a community. In Berman, however, the United States Supreme Court justified urban 
renewal on the basis that governments should be able to condemn and regulate property for the 
creation of a more attractive community.   
An analysis of the jurisprudence following Berman indicated that courts were more likely 
to uphold aesthetic or historic zoning ordinances. For example, in a 1955 opinion, the Supreme 
 vi 
 
Court of Massachusetts cited Berman and stated that, because construction of aesthetically or 
historically incompatible structures could destroy the historic character of a town, historic zoning 
ordinances fell within the scope of the police power. In short, the cases identified by this Thesis 
ultimately indicated that Berman had an impact on the acceptance of aesthetic and historic 
zoning. Therefore, they suggest that the programs of historic zoning and urban renewal, while 
seemingly in opposition, share fundamental legal roots. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1978, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a divided decision, generally 
recognized the validity of historic preservation ordinances in the landmark case Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.
1
 Since 1978, the historic preservation movement in the 
United States has continued to grow. Currently, a number of laws, regulations, and policies at the 
federal, state, and local levels affect millions of properties across the nation. 
Government managed historic preservation began with the admirable intention of 
preserving “the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation . . . as a living part of our 
community life and development in order to give a sense of orientation to the American 
people.”2 With a growing number of laws and designated historic districts, however, some 
property owners and residents have grown concerned that historic preservation efforts may harm 
both their individual interests and their larger communities.
3
 Indeed, many of those affected by 
historic preservation laws have reason to be concerned. Within urban environments nationwide, a 
multitude of neighborhoods have been designated as historic by government at all levels.
4
 Many 
residents of these neighborhoods still have very real memories of an earlier government program 
that sought to create better neighborhoods and cities, urban renewal. Residents fear that historic 
                                                 
1
 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The primary challenge to the New York City Landmark 
Ordinance was that, as applied to Plaintiff’s property, it constituted a takings requiring just 
compensation. In reaching the conclusion that the ordinance did not amount to a takings, the 
majority generally recognized the validity of historic zoning and landmark designation. See infra 
notes 283-91 and accompanying text. 
2
 National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2) (2006). 
3
 See, e.g., Jess R. Phelps, Moving Beyond Preservation Paralysis? Evaluating Post-
Regulatory Alternatives for Twenty-First Century Preservation, 37 VT. L. REV. 113, 113 (2012). 
4
 See, e.g., Ryan Howell, note, Throw the “Bums” Out? A Discussion of the Effects of 
Historic Preservation Statutes on Low-Income Households Through the Process of Urban 
Gentrification in Old Neighborhoods, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 541, 545-46 (2008) 
(discussing historic preservation ordinances). 
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preservation laws will lead to the same pain of displacement felt by communities affected by 
Twentieth Century urban renewal programs.
5
 Indeed, some scholars have even noted that 
government managed historic preservation ultimately has its roots in mid-century urban 
renewal.
6
 Others take a different, though not inherently contradictory, approach, arguing that 
historic preservation, as a movement, grew from the opposition to mid-century interventionist, 
demolition based urban renewal tactics.
7
 
This Thesis will expand on current scholarship regarding the links between historic 
preservation and urban renewal. It will begin by exploring the roots of mid-century urban 
renewal programs and of historic preservation programs. The focus will then turn to a direct 
analysis of the fundamental legal similarities of urban renewal and historic preservation as 
developed in case law. Specifically, this Thesis will compare historic preservation and aesthetic 
regulation cases prior to the United States Supreme Court’s seminal Urban Renewal decision in 
Berman v. Parker to historic preservation cases following that decision. This approach will be 
used to help determine the effect that the Berman decision had on the legal status of historic 
preservation laws. This Thesis hopes to contribute to the existing scholarship by outlining in 
                                                 
5
 See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of 
Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 513-14 (1981) (“Low-income interest associations 
such as the National Urban Coalition fear that rehabilitation in historic districts, leading to steep 
rent increases, will force low-income tenants to leave their old neighborhoods, without even the 
benefit of the Uniform Relocation Act payments that once assisted those displaced by urban 
renewal projects . . . .”). 
6
 See Stephanie R. Ryberg, Historic Preservation’s Urban Renewal Roots: Preservation 
and Planning in Midcentury Pennsylvania, 39 J. URBAN HISTORY 193, 194 (2013) (arguing that 
mid-century Philadelphia planners adopted plans that preserved buildings “not based on a sense 
of historic value, but rather a pragmatic desire to ease plan implementation”); see also Rose, 
supra note 5, at 509 (“The 1950s and early 1960s urban renewal plans for preservation have a 
continuing influence in historic district planning.”). 
7
 See, e.g., U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON HISTORIC 
PRESERVATION, WITH HERITAGE SO RICH (1966). 
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detail the field of historic preservation jurisprudence before and after Berman. Such an outline 
will aid in determining whether the legal foundations of urban renewal and historic preservation 
are inextricably linked.
 8
 Finally, this Thesis briefly suggests alternatives to traditional historic 
preservation zoning that could deliver similar preservationist results while protecting residents 
and property owners from the potential downsides of zoning based approaches. 
  
                                                 
8
 As used in this Thesis, the term “urban renewal” refers specifically to the renewal 
programs of the mid twentieth century characterized by the condemnation and demolition of 
properties later redeveloped through public-private partnerships. See infra notes 14-26 and 
accompanying text. Such programs were upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Berman 
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). This Thesis is mostly concerned with the legal relationship 
between historic preservation and urban renewal at the local level. That is, the primary topic 
discussed is the concept of the police power and general welfare as used to justify both local 
urban renewal programs and local historic zoning ordinances. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Urban renewal and historic preservation programs are frequently considered to be polar 
opposites.
9
 One seeks to raze and rebuild while the other seeks to preserve. The traditional 
narrative holds that preservation movements gained traction and support as a result of “heavy-
handed” urban renewal programs.10 While the historic preservation movement may have gained 
much ground following the implementation, and often failure, of mid-century urban renewal 
efforts, the traditional narrative for most parts fails to recognize the overlapping legal similarities 
between the programs and the fact that private historic preservation efforts began in the United 
States decades before the implementation of the urban renewal programs.  
Direct comparative analyses between the two programs, are few; however, work has been 
undertaken to demonstrate that the traditional narrative cannot explain the whole story. For 
example, Professor Ryberg has argued that historic preservation was but one tool used by 
planners undertaking urban renewal.
11
 Her research has showed that planners in Philadelphia 
were faced with market constraints and so had to carefully choose when to tear down and when 
                                                 
9
 “Traditional histories on mid-Twentieth Century urban renewal paint a relatively black-
and-white picture One of the most powerful and entrenched narratives about the era is that 
demolition prevailed over preservation. Emanating out of this belief, many scholars and 
practitioners argue that the modern preservation profession developed in direct response to the 
destructive policies and practices of midcentury city planning.” Ryberg, supra note 6, at 193. 
10
 Eugenie Ladner Birch & Douglad Roby, The Planner and the Preservationist: An 
Uneasy Alliance, 50 J. AM. PLAN. ASSOC. 194, 199 (1984). Birch and Roby do note that there 
were successful collaborations between urban renewal and preservation, for example in 
Philadelphia, but that they “remained a minor part of the total project costs of the Philadelphia 
[renewal] program.” Id. at 198. 
11
 See Ryberg, supra note 6.   
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to preserve.
12
 Although their preservation of structures was not based on a sense of historic 
value, they consciously used historic preservation as a tool for urban renewal.
13
 
Still, the history of both urban renewal and historic zoning is complicated and worth 
developing before this Thesis proceeds with an analysis of the legal similarities between the two 
regimes. This review will focus on the history behind each program, the legislative origins of the 
programs, the goals for the programs, and both positive and negative criticism of the programs. 
Such a review will help to frame the discussion in Chapter Six of jurisprudence relating to each 
program. 
A. Urban Renewal 
Broadly stated, urban renewal is a systematic program of redeveloping an urban system 
that has fallen into decay.
14
 Typically, the program is undertaken as a partnership between public 
agencies and the private sector.
15
 While urban renewal programs had existed in various forms as 
early as the late Nineteenth Century, the seminal programs in the United States were undertaken 
during the mid-Twentieth Century.
16
 These urban renewal programs were based in large part on 
trust in the proficiency of professional planners and government officials.
17
 The “physical 
amelioration” of the urban environment was viewed as the solution to various ills that had 
                                                 
12
 See id. at 194. 
13
 Id. 
14
 See,e.g., Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 URB. 
LAW. 423 (2010). 
15
 Stacey A. Sutton, Urban Revitalization in the United States: Policies and Practices, 
UNITED STATES URBAN REVITALIZATION RESEARCH PROJECT (2008). 
16
 See id. at 27-29. 
17
 Id. at 28 (“There was a general confidence in government, particularly in its ability to 
stimulate a weak economy through investment and public works.”). 
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befallen America’s major urban centers.18 As Altshuler and Luberoff note, urban leaders 
believed that only “radical surgery” would stem the “death spiral” of their cities.19 This radical 
surgery took the form of government sponsored redevelopment plans. Plans were proposed and 
adopted by city officials in a centralized, rational style of planning.
20
  
i. Brief History 
In the United States, Urban Renewal arose in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth 
Century as a tool to combat a perceived deterioration in the urban environment.
21
 Urban renewal 
continues to this day in various forms, notably through economic development programs.
22
 The 
specific term “urban renewal,” however, most usually invokes the large scale, government 
sponsored “slum clearance” programs undertaken during the middle of the Twentieth Century. In 
this form, Urban Renewal was undertaken by local governments which received funding from 
the federal government.
23
  
The tool used by local governments to accomplish urban renewal was that of eminent 
domain. The procedure was relatively straightforward. A locality would simply condemn areas 
that it deemed blighted and then would either develop the land itself or transfer the land to a 
                                                 
18
 Id. 
19
 ALAN A. ALTSHULER & DAVID LUBEROFF, MEGAPROJECTS: THE CHANGING POLITICS OF 
URBAN PUBLIC INVESTMENT 14 (2003). 
20
 See Sutton, supra note 15, at 27; see also MICAHEL P. BROOKS, PLANNING THEORY FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 81-95 (AICP 2003) (discussing the nature of the centralized rationality planning 
paradigm). 
21
 See Lavine, supra note 14 (discussing the City Beautiful movement in Washington 
D.C.); see also Sutton, supra note 15, at 23-25 (discussing attention paid to the deterioration of 
the built environment during the early twentieth century). 
22
 See Lavine, supra note 14. (discussing the connection between urban renewal and the 
justification for economic development in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005)). 
23
 See Jon C. Teaford, Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 
443, 444-45 (2000); see also Sutton, supra note 15, at 23. 
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private party for development.
24
 Historically, the application of eminent domain had been limited 
to scenarios in which the government condemned property and then put it to a public use, such as 
a government building or a park.
25
 The use of eminent domain for urban renewal, however, 
raised the problem that the land condemned was not actually being physically used by the 
government.
26
  
ii. Goals and Expectations 
 
The Urban Renewal programs undertaken in the mid twentieth century under federal 
tutelage did not necessarily set out to damage the physical and sociological fabric of America’s 
cities through the destruction of the traditional built environment and the displacement of 
residents. Rather, the urban renewal programs seemed to have been undertaken with the support 
of cities and their disadvantaged residents in mind.
27
 For example, the Federal Housing Act of 
                                                 
24
 Sutton, supra note 15, at 25 (“Government would play a central role by using eminent 
domain to assembly the land and provide ancillary infrastructure improvements . . . . The land 
would then be turned over to private developers for rebuilding.”). See, e.g., District of Columbia 
Redevelopment Act of 1945, 60 Stat. 760 (1946) (Washington D.C.’s urban renewal program). 
25
 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (discussing how the original meaning of the Public Use Clause was that government 
could take property only when it actually uses that property or gives the public a right to use it). 
26
 See ALTSHULER & LUBEROFF, supra note 19, at 14-15 (noting how using eminent 
domain to this end a few years earlier would have “doubtless” been found unconstitutional). A 
full analysis of the history behind the doctrine of “public use” and “public purpose” is beyond 
the scope of this Thesis. However, the analysis contained herein regarding the scope of the police 
power and the general welfare is closely related to the evolution of the understanding of public 
use. 
27
 See Teaford, supra note 23, at 444 (discussing how a diverse coalition backed Title I of 
the Housing Act of 1949, especially social welfare leaders and advocates of low and moderate 
income housing who believed urban renewal would “better the living conditions of the poor”). 
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1949, which made available federal funds for local renewal projects, provided that there be “a 
feasible method for the temporary relocation of families displaced from the project area.”28  
Urban renewal programs were undertaken with the objective of restoring cities that had 
fallen into decay.
29
 Moreover, the programs were often undertaken with the express purpose of 
assisting impoverished city residents living in, what were deemed, unsanitary conditions.
30
 For 
example, dwellings on Vinegar Hill in Charlottesville, Virginia, largely were light wooden 
structures that lacked indoor plumbing and other modern sanitary features.
31
 By clearing away 
these older “blighted” units, urban renewal would “increase the stock of decent, affordable 
dwelling in the central cities.”32 In short, advocates hoped that through urban renewal and 
“[w]ith the aid of Uncle Sam, cities [would be] cleansed of their ugly past and reclothed in the 
latest modern attire.”33 
iii. Positive Outcomes and Support 
Admittedly, urban renewal programs did generate some positive outcomes, albeit through 
mechanisms harmful to many. For example, urban renewal did spur the removal of property that, 
                                                 
28
 Federal Housing Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-171, § 105(c), 63 Stat. 413, 417 (1949).  
29
 See Sutton, supra note 15, at 23-29; ALTSHULER & LUBEROFF, supra note 19, at 14. 
30
 See Quintin Johnstone, Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 301, 301-
06 (1958) (discussing how blight harms cities and residents alike, and arguing that decent low 
income housing can combat blight); Lavine, supra note 14 (discussing the use of federal funding 
and of renewal programs to clear slums and construct public housing); Teaford, supra note 23, at 
444 (discussing how urban renewal was seen as a method to better the living conditions of the 
poor). 
31
 See JAMES ROBERT SAUNDERS & RENAE NADINE SHACKLEFORD, URBAN RENEWAL AND 
THE END OF BLACK CULTURE IN CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA 3 (2005) (noting the condition of 
Vinegar Hill prior to urban renewal). 
32
 Teaford, supra note 23, at 444. 
33
 Id. at 443. 
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by many accounts, was actually subpar.
34
 Under the belief that blight bred blight, cities cleared 
“substandard” housing in order to provide the opportunity for the emergence of a more modern, 
healthy urban environment for city residents.
35
 
Teaford notes several successful developments that resulted from urban renewal. 
Following renewal, Baltimore’s Charles Center employed five thousand more individuals and tax 
receipts quadrupled, as compared to before renewal.
36
 The Lincoln Center project in New York 
helped to transform the Upper West Side of Manhattan into a thriving neighborhood.
37
 
Philadelphia’s Society Hill project resulted in a unique combination of new structures and 
rehabilitation of existing historic houses.
38
 As such, property tax receipts for the city increased 
from $454,000 annually to $2.47 million annually.
39
 Similarly, Chicago’s Hyde Park-Kenwood 
project utilized a combination of destruction and rehabilitation to preserve the health of the 
University of Chicago area.
40
 Despite the general success of these projects, Teaford notes that 
they were often accompanied by the downsides of displacement and removal of minority and low 
income residents.
41
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 See Johnstone, supra note 30, at 301-05 (discussing blight). 
35
 See id. at 301-06 (arguing that the construction of low-income housing “tends to 
prevent blight”); see also Teaford, supra note 23, at 443-45. 
36
 Teaford, supra note 23, at 451. 
37
 Id. at 451-52. 
38
 Id. at 452. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. at 452-53. 
41
 Id. at 451-54. 
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iv. Negative Outcomes and Criticisms  
The radical surgery of urban renewal usually took the form of blight clearing through the 
exercise of eminent domain.
42
 In the process, large numbers of individuals were displaced as city 
governments condemned privately owned property and transferred it to either city redevelopment 
authorities or private developers.
43
 As Lavine notes, “[t]he social impacts of urban renewal were 
huge, as lower class and often minority families were moved out of center cities to make room 
for uses that would generate higher tax revenues.”44 Moreover, the effect of Urban Renewal on 
minorities was often so pronounced that the programs were dubbed “negro removal.”45For 
example, Saunders and Shackleford note how the urban renewal project undertaken by 
Charlottesville, Virginia to modernize Vinegar Hill destroyed a vibrant minority community.
46
 
The program caused the displacement of hundreds of individuals and the disruption of an 
existing, thriving business community.
47
Moreover, although demolition had been completed by 
1965, renewal efforts were still incomplete nearly twenty years later.
 48
 
In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States directly addressed urban renewal 
programs utilizing eminent domain and declared them legal in Berman v. Parker.
49
 As professor 
Pritchett has noted, “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in Berman affected a dramatic expansion in 
the government’s powers of eminent domain and provided judicial legitimation for urban 
                                                 
42
 See, e.g., Sutton, supra note 15, at 25 
43
 See id. at 30 (noting that, between 1956 and 1972, 3.8 million residents were displaced 
by urban renewal and urban freeway construction); Teaford, supra note 23, at 445-51 (discussing 
the displacement caused by urban renewal programs).  
44
 See Lavine, supra note 14. 
45
 See Sutton, supra note 15, at 30 (discussing the focus and effects of urban renewal and 
urban freeway construction on black neighborhoods). 
46
 See SAUNDERS & SHACKLEFORD, supra note 31, at 1-6. 
47
 Id. at 3-4. 
48
 Id. at 3-5 (“As late as 1982 seven acres of the Hill remained vacant.”). 
49
 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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renewal efforts.”50 The Court’s approval of urban renewal increasingly allowed local 
governments to widely exercise eminent domain to condemn and transfer private property “in the 
name of housing, commercial, or industrial development.”51 Therefore, in addition to 
displacement, the practice and affirmation of urban renewal had the effect of eroding the 
protections of private property rights.
52
 
In short, the lasting legacy of urban renewal, despite any successes, is largely one of 
failure. Jacobs and Paulsen note that some “see this period as one in which planners destroyed 
vibrant urban communities, facilitated suburban sprawl, and caused protests, freeway revolts, 
racial animosity, and an anti-planning backlask that persists to today.”53 Indeed, the failures of 
urban renewal actively continue to this day in the form of new economic development urban 
renewal programs. For example, in the year 2000, the City of New London, Connecticut, 
undertook an economic development program utilizing eminent domain to condemn a large 
section of water front property and transfer it to a private developer.
54
 However, as of February 
2014, that property has remained largely vacant and undeveloped.
55
 
 
                                                 
50
 Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private 
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE LAW & POL’Y REV. 1, 47 (2003). 
51
 Id. at 48. 
52
 See Harvey M. Jacobs & Kurt Paulsen, Property Rights The Neglected Theme of 20th-
Century Planning, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 134, 137-38 (2009) (discussing the growing power of 
central planning in the mid-twentieth century). 
53
 Id. 
54
 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.469 (2005). 
55
 See Charlotte Allen, ‘Kelo’ Revisited, WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 10, 2014; Alec Torres, 
Nine Years after Kelo, the Seized Land is Empty, NATIONAL REVIEW (Feb. 5, 2014, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/370441/nine-years-after-kelo-seized-land-empty-alec-
torres.  
. 
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B. Historic Preservation 
This Thesis is primarily concerned with historic preservation through municipally 
enacted historic zoning ordinances. These ordinances are enacted by local governments and 
serve to preserve the historic character of a neighborhood by prohibiting demolition, 
construction, repair, or alteration without approval from the city government.
56
  
i. Brief History 
Historic preservation, generally, can be roughly divided into three schools of thought: 
“Monumentalism, Aestheticism, and Revitalization.”57 In the United States, Monumentalism 
focuses primarily on the protection and preservation of sites that are deemed important to the 
history and fabric of the early Republic and its heroes, especially the Founding Fathers.
58
 
Monumentalism has at its core a desire to promote the importance of historical principles in the 
abstract. Historically, Monumentalism was usually undertaken by private organizations.
59
 
Aestheticism focuses on the preservation of physical objects and places.
60
 In other words, 
Aestheticism regarded the physical form of structures, whether monumental or vernacular, as 
important in and of itself. Aestheticism, therefore, differs from Monumentalism in that 
Monumentalism can be ambivalent as to the preservation of an actual historic structure.
61
 
Moreover, Aestheticism relied more on government involvement than Monumentalism. As 
                                                 
56
 See, e.g., CITY OF RICHMOND, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES Ch. 114, § 114-930 to -930.9 
(2014) (regulations for the City of Richmond’s Old and Historic Districts).  
57
 Todd Schneider, note, From Monuments to Urban Renewal: How Different 
Philosophies of Historic Preservation Impact the Poor, 8 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 257, 
258 (2001). 
58
 Id.  
59
 Id. at 259 (noting that the “first successful large-scale preservation battle” was waged 
by the Mount Vernon Ladies Association).  
60
 Id. at 260. 
61
 See id. at 259. 
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Schneider notes, Aestheticism became increasingly popular in the early twentieth century and led 
to the designation of local historic districts by municipal governments.
62
   
Revitalization grew out of the foundations of Aestheticism. Where Aestheticism focused 
on the aesthetics of individual structures or neighborhoods as a public good worthy of 
preservation and protection, Revitalization saw the larger urban system as a good that needed 
protection.
63
 In large part, revitalization efforts focused on the good created by a traditional city 
system of mixed use districts and varied physical and social fabrics.
64
 Rypkema takes a similar 
approach and argues that preserving and revitalizing older structures serves a public good by 
providing affordable housing and more-walkable environments.
65
 Revitalization, therefore, 
represents a shift in historic preservation. Rather than focusing strictly on the historic character 
of a structure or site, Revitalization, at least in part, focuses on planning for an urban system’s 
future based on methods that worked in the past.
66
 In this way, revitalization efforts can be 
viewed as a tool of urban renewal programs.
67
 Indeed, professor Ryberg has argued that mid-
Twentieth Century urban renewal programs selectively utilized preservation and Revitalization 
as a means to achieve successful renewal with limited resources.
68
 
Professor Byrne has argued a similar position by noting that historic preservation efforts 
“frustrate central control of decisionmaking and megaprojects and shield smaller-scaled, diffused 
                                                 
62
 Id. at 261. 
63
 See id. at 261, 266-67. 
64
 Id. at 261. 
65
 Donovan D. Rypkema, Historic Preservation and Affordable Housing: The Missed 
Connection (2002). 
66
 See Schneider, supra note 57, at 260-61. 
67
 Id. 
68
 See Ryberg, supra note 6, at 193-97. 
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redevelopment [; thus] elevat[ing] community and authenticity.
69
 Again, the uses of preservation 
law seem to have moved away from strictly preserving the built environment towards the broader 
goal of “mak[ing] the modern city hospitable for contemporary life.”70  
ii. Goals and Expectations 
Succinctly stated, the broad objective of historic preservation is to preserve the built 
environments in order to secure the cultural history of the nation.
71
 The benefits of historic 
preservation are often described in intangible terms such as the enhancement of “quality of life 
for people”72 and the preservation “of cultural meaning and identity.”73 In other words, historic 
preservation serves as a link to the past, in order to provide a cultural base for the future.
74
 
Moreover, historic zoning in particular, as a tool of historic preservation, is seen as a way for 
governments to provide tangible benefits to a community through maintained or increased 
property values as well as municipal income generated through tourism.
75
 Professor Byrne has 
noted that “[l]ocalities market themselves to developers and visitors by touting their historic 
                                                 
69
 J. Peter Byrne, Historic Preservation and its Cultured Despisers: Reflections on the 
Contemporary Role of Preservation Law in Urban Development, 19 GEO. MASON LAW REV. 
665, 688 (2012). 
70
 Id. at 687. 
71
 See, e.g., National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470(b) (2006). 
72
 Frank B. Gilbert, Precedents for the Future, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 312 
(1971) (quoting Robert Stipe, Address at the 1971 Conference on Preservation Law ( May 1, 
1971)); see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1978) 
(quoting Gilbert). 
73
 Gregory S. Alexander, The Social Obligation of Norm in American Property Law, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 796 (2009) (arguing that the benefits of historic structures are essential to 
cultural meaning and identity, and therefore that private owners should be prevented from tearing 
down historic structures); see also Byrne, supra note 69, at 676-77 (discussing Alexander’s 
argument) (“The cultural heritage conveyed by a community’s historic buildings is a public 
good, the value of which is not fully internalized in private property rights.”). 
74
 See 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(4). 
75
 See, e.g., Howell, supra note 4, at 550 (discussing the link between the preservation of 
historic buildings, economic revitalization, and tourism). 
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resources. But most importantly, local historic preservation laws regulate the demolition and 
alteration of numerous designated historic buildings and sites within many of the most dynamic 
urban real estate markets [across the country].”76  
iii. Positive Outcomes and Support 
The most obvious positive effect of historic preservation through zoning is that it serves 
to preserve historic structures and environments, many of which are aesthetically pleasing. While 
this outcome is tangible and subjective, it is generally considered positive.
77
 The preservation of 
such districts and structures has been recognized as having benefit to the community at large, 
helping to ground citizens in a sense of time and place.
 78
 Moreover, these historic districts are 
often more human scaled than modern developments.
79
 Therefore, their preservation helps to 
preserve a walkable urban environment.
80
 
Additionally, Rypkema has noted many economic benefits to historic preservation 
generally. Leaving aside displacement concerns, the designation of properties as historic 
generally helps to maintain or raise property values, seemingly because historic districts are 
                                                 
76
 See Byrne, supra note 69, at 665-66. 
77
 See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The “Conservation Game”: The Possibility of 
Voluntary Cooperation in Preserving Buildings of Cultural Importance, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 733, 734 (1997) (“The various benefits attributed to the physical, built environment 
include the cultivation of community solidarity and stability, the advancement of individuals’ 
orientation and identity, and the encouragement of aesthetic excellence as well as enjoyment.”). 
78
 See id. 
79
 See Rypkema, supra note 65, at 13 (comparing historic neighborhoods to new urban 
forms and concluding that existing historic neighborhoods are preferable even to new urbanism, 
because historic neighborhoods are “real urbanism”). 
80
 See id. at 7-8 (discussing the proximity of historic housing to schools, jobs, and public 
transit). 
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desirable areas to live.
81
 Moreover, Rypkema has noted that rehabilitation can often be more 
cost-effective than new construction.
82
 The cost effectiveness of rehabilitation can be 
compounded by the availability of tax abatement or tax credits generally available to historic 
rehabilitation projects.
83
 Moreover, it has been argued that rehabilitation and reuse are the 
“greenest” form of construction.84  
iv.  Negative Outcomes and Criticisms 
Perhaps the greatest criticism of historic zoning is that it results in gentrification and 
displacement.
85
 Gentrification, in and of itself, may not be negative, however, it is closely linked 
with displacement, which generally is considered negative.
86
 Displacement is considered to 
occur when individuals involuntarily relocate due to rising rents, taxes, cost of ownership, or 
even forced government action.
87
 Historic zoning has also seen general resistance from 
neighborhood associations.
88
 Residents fear that historic preservation laws will lead to the same 
                                                 
81
 See Donovan D. Rypkema, The (Economic Value) of National Register Listing, 25 
CULTURAL RESOURCE MGMT. 6 (2002); see also Howell, supra note 4, at 551. 
82
 See Rypkema, supra note 65, at 10. 
83
 See id. at 10-12, 15-16. 
84
 See NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, THE GREENEST BUILDING: 
QUANTIFYING THE ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE OF BUILDING REUSE 84 (2011). 
85
 See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405, 405 (2003) 
(noting that historic preservation laws are often blamed for setting gentrification in motion, but 
ultimately arguing that that perception is flawed). 
86
 See generally id. at 410-15 (“The federal government has taken the view that 
displacement from gentrification has never been a serious problem. Advocates for the poor, on 
the other hand, have long argued that displacement occurs on a large scale and have called for 
government action to protect low-income residents.”).   
87
 See id. at 412 (discussing the causes of displacement within the gentrification context); 
supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing displacement caused by urban renewal). 
88
 See Phelps, supra note 3, at 113 (“Preservationists are increasingly aware of a growing 
reluctance in many communities against the formation of new local historic districts (LHDs) or 
other forms of local regulatory preservation restrictions.”). 
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pain of displacement felt by communities affected by Twentieth Century urban renewal 
programs.
89
 
Another concern regarding historic zoning is that it is fundamentally based on subjective 
considerations. The determination of the cultural, historic, or aesthetic value of a structure or 
district is something over which reasonable people may disagree, and therefore it is difficult to 
apply standards governing the administration of historic zoning.
90
 
Historic zoning laws can also be considered to adversely affect certain First Amendment 
rights.
91
 It has been suggested that historic zoning ordinances could abridge First Amendment 
rights by prohibiting landowners from erecting signs or commissioning art on the exterior of 
their buildings.
92
 
                                                 
89
 See Rose, supra note 5 at 513-14. 
90
 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.1 (1978) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the subjective nature of the New York landmark 
preservation ordinance); see also Eric J. Remington, Do Subjective Preservation Standards 
Trump Objective Zoning Standards?, 7 LAND USE Q. 7, 7-8 (2012) (discussing subjective and 
objective preservation language in North Carolina law); cf. Eleanor Gorski, Regulating New 
Construction in Historic Districts: Contemporary Design, The ALLIANCE REVIEW, March/April 
2011, at 17-18 (discussing the problems associated with providing for new, contemporary styles 
of design in historic districts); David Payne, Charleston Contradictions: A Case Study of 
Historic Preservation Theories and Policies (Jan. 1, 2013) (Ph.d. dissertation, Clemson 
University), available at 
http://tigerprints.clemson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2140&context=all_dissertations, 
(generally discussing the competing theories as to the subjective nature of design and how that 
nature complicates preservation decision-making); John King, Re-evaluating S.F. Historic 
Preservation Framework, SFGATE (May 1, 2011, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/place/article/Re-evaluating-S-F-historic-preservation-
framework-2373053.php (“The dilemma with preservation today is that in an ever-more-
subjective world, true believers - or politically adroit cynics - can make the case for almost 
anything.”). 
91
 Timothy L. Binetti, note, Culture Club or the Clash? Historic Preservation, Aesthetic 
Uniformity and Artistic Freedom, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 313 passim 
(2003). 
92
 Id. 
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Finally, historic zoning has been noted to lead to “pre-emptive demolition.” Pre-emptive 
demolition occurs when a building owner discovers that a city is considering historical 
designation for a building, and then preemptively takes measures to ensure that designation does 
not occur.
 93
 These measures can range from alterations to remove historic features from the 
structure to demolition.
94
 
C. Comparisons 
Scholars have noted similarities between urban renewal and historic zoning. As Lavine 
notes, the Berman decision had far reaching effects in that it established an important precedent 
that would eventually be used to legitimize historic preservation laws.
95
 Similarly, Allison and 
Peters have noted that “[t]he Berman decision paved the way for historic preservation 
regulation.”96 In Berman, the Court used language of aesthetic value to validate urban renewal 
programs.
97
 Fourteen years later, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the 
Court again used the language of aesthetics in generally recognizing the validity of historic 
preservation laws.
98
 Furthermore, Clark has noted that the origins of historic zoning laws in New 
                                                 
93
 See Robin Pogrebin, Preservationists See Through Bulldozers Charging Through a 
Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2008, at C1; see also Mark Lamster, Modernist Masterwork 
Demolished in Fort Worth, GUIDELIVE, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS (June 22, 2013, 1:19 PM), 
http://artsblog.dallasnews.com/2013/06/modernist-masterwork-demolished-in-fort-worth.html/. 
94
 See Pogrebin, supra note 93 (“The owner . . . rushes to obtain a demolition or stripping 
permit from the city’s Department of Buildings so that notable qualities can be removed, 
rendering the structure unworthy of [historic] protection.”); Lamster, supra note 93 (discussing 
the demolition of a modernist house before preservationists could succeed in defending it). 
95
 Lavine, supra note 14. 
96
 ERIC W. ALLISON & LAUREN PETERS, HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND THE LIVABLE CITY 
25 (2011); see also Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic 
Property, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 715 (1963) (discussing the connection between Berman v. 
Parker and aesthetic regulations). 
97
 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. at 26, 33 (1954). 
98
 See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129 (1978); ALLISON 
& PETERS, supra note 96, at 24-25. 
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York can be found in earlier renewal legislation and the Supreme Court’s analysis in Berman.99 
This Thesis will build on this earlier work by directly comparing case law prior to and following 
Berman to determine the effect that the case had on historic zoning regulations. 
  
                                                 
99
 See Carol Clark, Albert S. Bard and the Origin of Historic Preservation in New York 
State, 18 WIDENER L. REV. 323 (2012). 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
The fundamental tool of urban renewal is eminent domain. That power was used by 
localities and their agents to condemn properties deemed blighted, demolish them, and then 
develop them or transfer them to a private party for development. While eminent domain had 
been exercised prior to the advent of urban renewal, the Supreme Court specifically endorsed the 
use of eminent domain for urban renewal purposes in the landmark 1954 case, Berman v. 
Parker.
100
 Later, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Supreme Court 
upheld historic landmark designation and found that it did not constitute a taking, because it was 
a valid exercise of a locality’s police power.101 In reaching its decision, the Court also recognized 
the validity of historic zoning regulations in general.
102
 
The Berman and Penn Central cases seem quite different as one upholds the ability of a 
locality to condemn, take, and demolish private property in order to make way for new 
development, while the other upholds the ability of a locality to effectively mandate the 
preservation a privately owned piece of property. Both cases, however, broadly deal with the 
power of local governments to regulate in furtherance of the “general welfare.” An expansive 
view of what constitutes the general welfare can therefore be used to legally justify either 
                                                 
100
 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1955). 
101
 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). As discussed 
below in Chapter Five, the procedural history of Penn Central is more complicated. The New 
York Court of Appeals determined that that case was not about general zoning districts, but 
rather about the designation of individual structures as landmarks – a point conceded by the 
plaintiffs. Nonetheless, the majority of the United States Supreme Court, in upholding the 
designation and finding that no taking had occurred, generally found that landmark designation 
was similar to historic districting and joined the two concepts. See infra notes 283-91 and 
accompanying text. 
102
 438 U.S. at 129. 
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government sponsored destruction or preservation, even if against the wishes of individual 
property owners.  
Does such an expansive definition suggest that historic zoning and urban renewal are 
built on essentially the same legal principle? This Thesis seeks to answer that question by 
identifying, collecting, and analyzing case law from both before and after Berman v. Parker. By 
engaging in this analysis of case law, this Thesis seeks to explore the legal similarities between 
the programs in order to contribute to existing and future scholarship that seeks to compare the 
programs. Moreover, a comparison between the legal justifications for the programs will 
hopefully demonstrate that justifying police power action with an expansive understanding of the 
general welfare and the police power can lead to undesirable outcomes, even if such an 
expansive understanding is based on the laudable intentions of reviving an urban center or 
preserving historic structures. While there is still ongoing debate over the benefits, costs, and 
lasting effects of historic zoning, a potential similarity between the underlying legal basis for 
historic zoning and urban renewal should show that the exercise of the police power for the 
general welfare may be too dangerous to grant to a city council or planning commission. Even if 
an expansive reading of the general welfare can be used for the laudable intention of preserving 
the built cultural heritage of cities, states, and the nation, that same power could quickly be used 
instead to destroy those properties.  
The method used to answer the question posed by this Thesis is primarily doctrinal. 
Doctrinal research is that “which provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a 
particular legal category, analyses the relationship between rules, explains areas of difficulty and, 
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perhaps, predicts future developments.”103 Moreover, doctrinal research is based on the “black-
letter” of the law, and thus synthesizes, compares, and clarifies particular topics bases on an 
analysis of both authoritative legal texts, such as statutes and case law, in addition to secondary 
sources, such as scholarly commentary.
104
 Doctrinal research finds a strong corollary in the 
qualitative research methodology of the social sciences.
105
 Legal rules and regimes are not 
necessarily made up of quantifiable data, but rather on a set of norms that is both fixed and 
constantly evolving.
106
 Theoretical research seeks to create a “more complete understanding of 
the conceptual bases of legal principles.”107 Comparative and historical research describes 
contrasting legal regimes and contextualizes them within a selected era using social sciences, in 
this case, Urban and Regional Planning.
108
 
To undertake this analysis, it was first necessary to identify cases across the United States 
that dealt with the issue of historic zoning. These cases were then compared with Berman v. 
Parker and analyzed against that case. If the same justification was used in historic zoning cases 
as Berman v. Parker, then inferentially it can be concluded that both historic zoning and urban 
renewal are based on the same legal foundation. These authoritative sources are analyzed and 
synthesized using both the doctrinal and theoretical methods to offer a more complete 
understanding of the development of both historic zoning and urban renewal legal regimes. 
                                                 
103
 See Terry C. Hutchinson & Nigel Duncan, Defining and Describing What We Do: 
Doctrinal Legal Research, 17 DEAKIN L. REV. 83, 98 (2012); MARTHA MINOW, ARCETYPAL 
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP – A FIELD GUIDE, in AALS WORKSHOP FOR NEW LAW TEACHERS (AALS, 
2006), available at http://www.aals.org/documents/2006nlt/nltworkbook06.pdf. 
104
 MIKE MCCONVILLE & WING HONG CHUI, RESEARCH METHODS FOR LAW 3-4 (2007). 
105
 Hutchinson & Duncan, supra note 103, at 107. 
106
 Id at 107-08. 
107
 Id. 
108
 See Minow, supra note 103. 
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Cases were identified by searching the WestlawNext database. A search was made of all 
state and federal cases prior to November 22, 1954, the date of the Berman decision. The query 
was to find all cases that contained the word “zon***” and any of the following terms: “historic 
district” “historic preservation” “landmark ordinance.” This search was used to find any case that 
dealt with any sort of government sponsored historic preservation zoning program. The word 
zon***, using universal figures, was searched as is so as to allow for the return of any case that 
may mention, for example, “historic district zoning” but not “historic zones,” or “historic zone” 
but not “historic zoning.” The general term “historic” was not used in the search query because it 
would generate too many irrelevant results owing to the common nature of the term.
109
 
The first search, as described above, generated no results. For purposes of this Thesis, 
however, it is necessary to determine the state of historic zoning prior to Berman in order to 
determine if Berman and urban renewal were fundamentally legally related to historic zoning. 
Therefore, analogous ordinances in existence, and challenged in the courts, before Berman had to 
be identified. Zoning ordinances had become common practice prior to Berman, and zoning on 
the basis of aesthetics was an issue frequently addressed by the courts as they developed the 
concept of the general welfare. 
Historic zoning has been considered a form of aesthetic zoning; and, therefore, aesthetic 
zoning provides an analogous form of ordinance prior to Berman that can be compared to 
historic zoning following Berman.
110
 Aesthetic zoning is essentially a zoning practice that bases 
                                                 
109
 The exact syntax of the search was: advanced: (“historic preservation” “historic 
district” “landmark ordinance”) & zon*** & DA (bef 11-22-1954). 
110
 See, e.g., Estate of Neuberger v. Middletown, 521 A.2d 1336, 1340 (N.J. App. 1987) 
(citing MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §25.31 (3d ed. 1986)) (“Historic preservation 
has been classified as an aspect of aesthetics in zoning.”); see also Julie Van Camp, Aesthetics 
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regulations solely on the outward aesthetic appearance of a structure. Because historic zoning has 
been considered a form of aesthetic zoning, the term “aesthetic” was added to the query for cases 
prior to November 22, 1954.
111
 This search one hundred and sixty-seven results from the high 
courts of thirty-eight states.  
Next, essentially the same search was conducted for cases after November 22, 1954 but 
before June 26, 1978, the date of the Penn Central decision. The requirement that results include 
the search term “historic” was also added to the query, to ensure that results were limited to those 
that actually dealt with historic ordinances.
112
 This refinement allowed for a more precise 
analysis of the effects of Berman on historic zoning jurisprudence. If the additional term were 
not added, the search would have returned many results that did not deal with historic zoning, for 
example those that dealt only with aesthetic zoning issues related to the First Amendment. This 
search was undertaken with the latter date restriction in order to identify cases that upheld the 
validity of historic zoning ordinances prior to the Penn Central case. It was necessary to identify 
these cases separately in order to determine whether the doctrines justifying urban renewal in 
Berman had been used to justify historic zoning, even before the Supreme Court generally 
                                                                                                                                                             
and the law of Historic Preservation, presented to the American Society for Aesthetics (October 
23, 1980), available at http://csulb.edu/`jvancamp/ASA_1980.pdf (“The use of legal means to 
promote and regulate historic preservation is often justified by appeal to aesthetic values . . . .”).   
111
 The exact syntax of the search was: advanced: (“historic preservation” “historic 
district” “landmark ordinance” “aesthetic”) & zon*** & DA (bef 11-22-1954). 
112
 The exact syntax of the search was: advanced: (“historic preservation” “historic 
district” “landmark ordinance” “aesthetic”) & zon*** & historic & DA (aft 11-22-1954 & bef 6-
26-1978). 
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addressed historic zoning in Penn Central.
113
 This search generated forty-nine total results from 
the high courts of twenty-three states. 
Following these searches, the results of cases before and after the Berman decision were 
compared. First, the results were compared to identify state high court decisions that were 
represented in both groups of cases. This was done for the purpose of identifying states that may 
or may not have changed their jurisprudence specifically because of the United States Supreme 
Court’s holding in Berman. It was important to identify states that may have issued decisions 
regarding aesthetic and historic zoning both before and after Berman in order to determine 
whether Berman, and thus the legal justification for urban renewal, impacted the legal 
justification for historic zoning. This comparison revealed that the high courts of nineteen states 
rendered decisions on the issues identified both prior to and following the Berman decision.
114
 
This comparison reduced the case lists to ninety-seven cases prior to Berman and forty-five cases 
following Berman.
115
 Next, a doctrinal analysis of these cases was undertaken to develop an 
overview of the conception of the general welfare and the police power as related to aesthetic 
and historic zoning in these nineteen states before and after the Berman decision. 
                                                 
113
 As discussed below, historic zoning, per se, was not a direct issue in Penn Central. At 
issue was a landmark ordinance that provided for the designation of discrete structures as 
landmarks. Nonetheless, in upholding the landmark ordinance as a valid exercise of the 
regulatory power, and one that does not necessitate compensation, the Supreme Court generally 
recognized the constitutionality of historic zoning pursuant to a comprehensive plan. See Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 129-33 (1978); see also infra notes 283-91 and 
accompanying text. 
114
 The states were Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington. 
115
 Full lists of these cases are included below in Appendices A and B. 
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A summary of these cases is contained below in Chapters Four and Five, and an analysis 
follows in Chapter Six. The summaries and analyses are undertaken with the ultimate goal of 
determining if Berman, which laid out the legal justification for urban renewal, marked a 
definitive change in the concept of the general welfare and the police power, thereby allowing 
historic zoning to proceed.
116
  
                                                 
116
 A discussion on the scope or  propriety of using judicial review to determine what 
does or does not constitute the general welfare and outer bounds of the police power is beyond 
scope of this Thesis.  Rather, this Thesis seeks simply to analyze how the understanding of the 
police power and the concept of the general welfare, as developed in case law, underlies a 
fundamental legal similarity between urban renewal and historic preservation. 
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IV. JURISPRUDENCE PRIOR TO BERMAN  
The initial search for cases decided prior to Berman that involved the validity of historic 
zoning returned no results. The lack of results cannot be read to suggest that no historic 
ordinances existed prior to the Berman decision; however, it can be read to suggest that any such 
ordinances were not widely challenged. Moreover, it is possible that the search was under 
inclusive as such ordinances could have been identified by other titles early in the Twentieth 
Century. Nonetheless, to compare the judicial interpretation of historic zoning before and after 
Berman’s urban renewal decision, cases prior to Berman that dealt with issues analogous to 
historic zoning needed to be identified. To this end, the search term “aesthetic” was added to the 
search query. “Aesthetic” was chosen because zoning for aesthetic considerations has been 
analogized to zoning for historic preservation. A search for cases including the term “aesthetic” 
prior to Berman returned ninety-seven cases from the high courts of the nineteen states that also 
rendered opinions on these zoning issues following Berman. Therefore, summaries of the 
concept of aesthetic zoning and the general welfare in these nineteen states, prior to the Berman 
decision, are contained below. 
Overall, an analysis of these cases revealed that the high courts of most of the nineteen 
states identified refused to recognize aesthetics, alone, as a legitimate exercise of the police 
power for the general welfare. In other words, the courts would not uphold any ordinance or law 
that appeared to restrict the use of private property on solely aesthetic grounds. In so doing, the 
courts repeatedly stated that the only legitimate use of the police power was to regulate property 
so as to protect public health, safety, morality, or welfare. Importantly, the concept of “welfare” 
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was, comparatively, narrowly defined so as not to include aesthetics alone.
117
 Many of these 
courts, however, did recognize that the aesthetics and beauty of the community was a matter of 
public interest and could be tangentially related to the exercise of the police power.
118
 In other 
words, these courts refused to declare invalid an ordinance that regulated property in the interest 
of public health or safety, but also had the effect of creating, in the eyes of the city government 
or justices, a more aesthetically pleasing environment. A more detailed discussion of the relevant 
aspects of these cases and the implications for the states identified follows below. A brief 
summary of Berman v. Parker is also included below as it is used as the before and after point of 
reference for jurisprudence discussed in this Thesis. 
A. State Summaries 
Arkansas 
In Herring v. Stannus, the Supreme Court of Arkansas determined that the city council 
did not abuse its discretion by issuing a special permit for a filling station in a zone that 
prohibited such establishments.
119
 While the court did not explicitly reach the issue of aesthetics 
in its holding, however, it did "conced[e] - without deciding – [that the] police power may not be 
used for purely aesthetic purposes.”120 
California 
                                                 
117
 See, e.g., Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 87 N.E.2d 9, 16 (Mass.1949) 
(noting that an ordinance may not be upheld on aesthetic grounds alone). 
118
 See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 216 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Mo.1948) (noting that 
where an ordinance may be upheld on other police power grounds, aesthetic considerations are 
entitled to some weight). 
119
 Herring v. Stannus, 275 S.W. 321, 325 (Ark. 1924). 
120
 Id. at 324. 
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Two California zoning cases prior to Berman specifically state that zoning ordinances 
that bear no substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morality, or welfare will be 
struck down as invalid. The Supreme Court of California stated as much in Feraut v. City of 
Sacramento, a case in which a general zoning scheme was upheld despite some spot zoning of 
businesses.
121
 While the court did not reach the issue of “aesthetics alone” zoning, it nonetheless 
maintained that zoning ordinances must be based on the foundation of protecting public health, 
safety, morality, or welfare.
122
 Again in Beverly Oil v. City of Los Angeles, the Supreme Court of 
California held that zoning must be related to public health, safety, or welfare.
123
 In that case, the 
court upheld a prohibition on certain expansions of an oil drilling operation by noting that oil 
drilling was specifically declared by law to be detrimental to public health, safety, and 
welfare.
124
 In short, the court did not uphold the ordinance on the basis of aesthetic sense, but 
rather on a tangible threat to the general welfare, as described in the code. 
Connecticut 
Several Connecticut cases tangentially discussed the issue of aesthetics in dicta. In Town 
of Windsor v. Whitney, the Supreme Court of Connecticut upheld a zoning ordinance that 
established building lines and setback requirements.
125
 The court, however, did not uphold the 
                                                 
121
 Feraut v. City of Sacramento, 269 P. 537, 541 (Cal. 1928). 
122
 Id. (“It is only when it is palpable that the measure in controversy has no real or 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare that it will be nullified 
by the courts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 
385 (Cal. 1925)). 
123
 Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 254 P.2d 865, 869 (Cal. 1953) (en banc). 
124
 Id. 
125
 Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 111 A. 354, 355-57 (Conn.1920) 
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ordinance on aesthetic grounds.
126
 Rather, the court analogized the restrictions to those that 
provide for adequate ventilation and air space, holding that such regulations fall within the scope 
of traditional police power activity, that is, regulation for the benefit of the public health, safety, 
or welfare.
127
 The court specifically noted that the building lines tended to “preserve the public 
health, add to the public safety from fire, and enhance the public welfare by bettering living 
conditions and increasing general prosperity of the neighborhood.”128 Rather than deciding the 
issue on aesthetic grounds, the court held that the ordinances served traditional police power 
functions related to protecting public health and safety. 
In Gionfriddo v. Town of Windsor and Murphy v. Town of Westport, the court reached 
largely similar conclusions. In Gionfriddo, the court declared an ordinance prohibiting the 
display of vehicles for sale to be unconstitutional, stating that aesthetics alone is not enough to 
justify the prohibition and that such a prohibition did not relate to property value, public health, 
safety, or welfare.
129
 In Murphy, the court remanded the case for lack of facts, but in so doing, 
noted that, even with a shifting conception of aesthetics and the police power, aesthetics alone 
could not be used to justify the use of the police power.
130
 
 
 
 
                                                 
126
 Id. The court did, however, discuss the changing conception of aesthetic 
considerations. See id. at 357. 
127
 Id. at 357 (“They regulate the air space, light, and ventilation of rooms. . . . 
Regulations of this character, if reasonable, do not constitute a taking of property.”). 
128
 Id. 
129
 Gionfriddo v. Town of Windsor, 81 A.2d 266, 268 (Conn. 1951). 
130
 Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 40 A.2d 177, 179-81, 183 (Conn. 1944). 
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Kansas 
In Ware v. City of Wichita, the Supreme Court of Kansas upheld a zoning ordinance that 
provided for the separation of land uses.
131
 In upholding the ordinance, the court discussed 
aesthetic regulations, but did not base its holding on aesthetic considerations alone.
132
While the 
court noted that the police power was broad, it ultimately upheld the ordinance on the basis that 
it provided for the public health, safety, and welfare.
133
 
Louisiana 
Prior to Berman, the Supreme Court of Louisiana largely seemed to pass on the issue of 
aesthetic alone zoning regulations. In New Orleans v. Southern Auto Wreckers, the court held 
that an ordinance requiring a certain type of fence around junkyards was invalid.
134
 While the 
court passed on the aesthetics argument raised at trial, it ultimately struck the ordinance because 
the particular fence mandated was not necessary for public safety.
135
 The court determined that 
as long as a property use did “not offend public morals or jeopardize the health and safety of the 
public,” it was a legitimate use.136  
                                                 
131
 Ware v. City of Wichita, 214 P. 99, 102 (Kan. 1923). 
132
 Id. (discussing the argument that aesthetic considerations “be recognized as sufficient 
in themselves”). 
133
 Id. at 101-02 (“It cannot be denied, however, that there is good ground for the view 
that a reasonable zoning ordinance has some pertinent relation to the health, safety, morals, and 
general welfare of the community.”). 
134
 City of New Orleans v. S. Auto Wreckers, 192 So. 523, 527 (La. 1939). 
135
 Id. (“This discussion and the decisions cited which touch [aesthetic reasons] have no 
application here, for the reason that this ordinance is a safety measure.”). 
136
 Id. 
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Similarly, in State ex rel Civello v. City of New Orleans, the court upheld an ordinance 
which prohibited business uses in residential districts.
137
 The court found that, in passing the 
ordinances, the locality reasonably had public health and safety considerations in mind.
138
 The 
court did not explicitly state that aesthetic considerations alone either could or could not serve as 
a justification for the police power. It did, however, note that, while prior precedent suggested 
aesthetic considerations alone were not sufficient, the general welfare likely encompassed 
aesthetics.
139
 
Thereafter, in New Orleans v. Levy, the court considered the validity of a historic district 
ordinance.
140
 The court upheld the ordinance on constitutional grounds, because the Louisiana 
Constitution had recently been amended to allow for the creation of historic districts.
141
 The 
court held that the ordinance was valid pursuant to the Louisiana Constitution, asserting that it 
properly preserved both the sentimental and commercial values of New Orleans.
142
 The court 
thus seemed to recognize the ordinance’s validity, in part, because it promoted tourism, and 
therefore, the commercial value of the city.
 143
 Nonetheless, the court did note in passing that 
“[p]erhaps esthetic considerations alone would not warrant an imposition of the several 
restrictions contained in the Vieux Carre Commission Ordinance.”144  
 
 
                                                 
137
 State ex rel Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440, 445 (La. 1923). 
138
 See Id. at 443-44. 
139
 See id. at 444. 
140
 City of New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So.2d 798 (La. 1953). 
141
 Id. at 799, 802-03. 
142
 Id. at 802 
143
 Id. at 801-03. 
144
 Id. at 803. 
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Maryland 
In Maryland Advertising Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
Court held that the city improperly denied the Plaintiff a permit to construct a billboard on a 
vacant lot on which billboards were not prohibited.
145
 The court did not reach the issue of 
aesthetic regulations for procedural reasons.
146
 However, the court did state that the city’s action 
was invalid because it was arbitrary and bore no relation to public health, safety, morals, or 
welfare.
147
  
In Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., the Maryland Court of Appeals held that an ordinance 
prohibiting the erection of new dwellings unless they were constructed as separate buildings was 
unconstitutional.
148
 The court stated that “[t]he act does not relate to the police power, and its 
enforcement would deprive the appellee of property rights guaranteed by the Constitution, which 
cannot be invaded for purely aesthetic purposes under the guise of the police power.”149 The 
court reached the same conclusion in Goldman v. Crowther, holding that ordinances which bore 
no relation to public health, safety, morals, or welfare, were void.
150
 The court noted that because 
the ordinances “rest[ed] solely upon aesthetic grounds,” they were invalid.151 
 
                                                 
145
 Maryland Advertising Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 86 A.2d 169, 173-74 (Md.1952). 
146
 Id. (“the decision in the instant case was not based on esthetic grounds”). 
147
 Id. (quoting Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (“[S]uch restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial relation to 
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. The action here, bearing no such relation, 
was arbitrary and invalid and should be reversed.”). 
148
 Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., 98 A. 547, 549 (Md.1916). 
149
 Id. 
150
 Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A. 50, 60 (Md.1925). 
151
 Id. 
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Massachusetts 
Prior to the Berman decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts routinely held 
that aesthetic considerations alone were not enough to warrant the exercise of the police power. 
In 122 Main Street v. City of Brockton, the Massachusetts court held that an ordinance 
establishing minimum building heights was invalid because it was unrelated to public health and 
safety.
152
 Particularly, the court found that the ordinance was seemingly based on aesthetic 
considerations — that structures less than two stories would harm the aesthetic nature of the 
street.
153
 However, the court explicitly rejected this rationale as a basis for the use of the police 
power.
154
  
Again in Barney and Casey v. Milton, the court held that an ordinance zoning the plaintiff 
landowner’s property as residential was invalid as applied to that particular property.155 This case 
is of particular importance because the high court reversed the decision of the trial judge, 
specifically because the trial judge upheld the ordinance based on aesthetic considerations 
alone.
156
 The Massachusetts court held that aesthetics alone was not a valid justification for using 
the police power to abridge property rights.
157
 
Michigan 
In a series of cases from 1943 through 1951, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that 
ordinances establishing minimum lot sizes or building sizes were invalid exercises of local 
                                                 
152
 122 Main St. Corp. v. City of Brockton, 84 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Mass.1949). 
153
 Id. at 15-16. 
154
 Id. 
155
 Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 87 N.E.2d 9, 16 (Mass.1949). 
156
 Id. at 14-15. 
157
 Id. at 14-16. 
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power.
158
 Specifically, the court noted that these ordinances were based more on aesthetic 
considerations than concerns for the public’s health, safety, or welfare.159 The court noted that 
neither aesthetic considerations alone nor the desire to protect property values alone was a valid 
use of the police power.
160
 Rather, the government action had to bear some relation to public 
health, safety, or welfare.
161
 
Missouri 
In City of St. Louis v. Friedman, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the validity of an 
ordinance that prohibited the operation of junk yards in an industrial zone.
162
 The court did, 
however, note that the decision was not based on aesthetic considerations alone, because 
aesthetics alone could not justify the use of the police power.
163
 The court, in other words, found 
the ordinance to be valid because it touched on traditionally recognized police power action. 
While the court did not explicitly state what justification was used, the language suggests that the 
court found the ordinance to be a valid exercise of the police power to protect public safety.
164
  
                                                 
158
 Senefsky v. Lawler, 12 N.W.2d 387 (Mich.1943); Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Lambert, 
24 N.W.2d 209 (Mich.1946); Elizabeth Lake Estates v. Waterford Twp., 26 N.W.2d 788 (Mich. 
1947); Hitchman v. Oakland Twp., 45 N.W.2d 306 (Mich.1951). These cases are of particular 
interest as the ordinances at issue could be considered as forms of exclusionary zoning. That is, 
by requiring a minimum building size throughout the town, lower income individuals may be 
unable to afford to live in the town. As these cases indicate, prior to Berman, these zoning 
schemes were likely invalid. Cf. S. Burlington Cnty. N.A.A.C.P. v. Twn. Of Mount Laurel, 456 
A.2d 390, 470-71 & n.62 (N.J. 1983) (five acre lot minimums not necessarily in violation of low 
income housing obligation; however, such minimums will serve as evidence of facial invalidity 
for exclusionary zoning). 
159
 12 N.W.2d at 390-91; 24 N.W.2d at 212-13; 26 N.W.2d at 792; 45 N.W.2d at 310-11. 
160
 12 N.W.2d at 390-91; 24 N.W.2d at 212-13; 26 N.W.2d at 792; 45 N.W.2d at 310-11. 
161
 12 N.W.2d at 390-91; 24 N.W.2d at 212-13; 26 N.W.2d at 792; 45 N.W.2d at 310-11. 
162
 City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 216 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Mo.1948). 
163
 Id. (“Esthetic values alone are not a sufficient basis for classification, but are entitled 
to some weight where other reasons for the exercise of the power are present.”). 
164
 See id. 
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New Hampshire 
In Sundeen v. Rogers, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld that validity of a 
zoning ordinance that established certain set back requirements for auxiliary buildings in 
residential districts.
165
 The landowner challenging the ordinance argued that it was grounded 
solely in aesthetic considerations.
166
 The court, however, rejected this argument and, citing 
general zoning jurisprudence, found that the setback requirements were in the interest of public 
health and safety.
167
 The court noted that, while aesthetics alone may not be enough to justify the 
use of the police power, aesthetics could be considered in conjunction with the protection of the 
public, health, safety, morals, or welfare.
168
 In short, the court upheld the ordinance on the basis 
of public health and safety, not on aesthetics alone. 
New York 
In Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, the Court of Appeals of New York held that an 
ordinance prohibiting businesses in a residential zone was invalid.
169
 The zone in question was 
located near the entrance to the village, and the ordinance was apparently adopted to ensure that 
the village frontage would remain aesthetically pleasing.
170
 The court was unable to find a 
justification for the ordinance in the protection of the public health, safety, or welfare.
171
 Noting 
                                                 
165
 Sundeen v. Rogers, 141 A. 142, 145-46 (N.H. 1928). 
166
 See id. at 144. 
167
 See id. at 145 (noting that the setbacks decrease the risk of fire and increase traffic 
safety). 
168
 See id. 
169
 Dowsey v. Vill. of Kensington, 177 N.E. 427, 430 (N.Y. 1931). 
170
 Id. 
171
 See id. 
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that the ordinance was justified with purely aesthetic reasons, the court found that ordinance was 
an invalid use of the police power.
172
 
North Carolina 
In Appeal of Parker, the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld the validity of an 
ordinance that prohibited the erection of a wall along the street line.
173
 The court did not uphold 
the ordinance on aesthetic grounds.
174
 Rather, the court upheld the ordinance on the basis that it 
protected public safety.
175
 The court noted that safe streets required open and unobstructed views 
over crossing and intersections.
176
 Therefore, the police power could be used to protect public 
safety by prohibiting the erection of walls along the street line that would create visual 
obstructions. In short, the court upheld the ordinance on public safety grounds; however, it did 
note that it would not be inappropriate to give some weight to aesthetic considerations as the 
ordinance could be upheld on other grounds.
177
 
Pennsylvania 
Prior to the decision in Berman, Pennsylvania courts strongly found that property owners 
could not be deprived of the right to use their property freely for purely aesthetic reasons. In 
Appeal of Medinger, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared an ordinance establishing 
minimum lot sizes to be unconstitutional.
178
 The court stated in strong language that "neither 
                                                 
172
 Id.  
173
 Appeal of Parker, 197 S.E. 706, 710 (N.C. 1938). 
174
 See id.at 710-11. 
175
 Id. at 710. 
176
 Id. 
177
 Id. at 711 (“while aesthetic considerations are by no means controlling, it is not 
inappropriate to give some weight to them”). 
178
 Appeal of Medinger, 104 A.2d 118, 122-23 (Pa.1954). 
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aesthetic reasons nor the conservation of property values or the stabilization of economic values 
in a township are, singly or combined, sufficient to promote the health or the morals or the safety 
or the general welfare of the township or its inhabitants or property owners."
179
  
Similarly, in Appeal of Lord, the court found that a zoning board acted improperly when 
it denied a permit for a landowner to erect a radio tower in a residential district.
180
 The court 
stated that a city cannot use zoning to deprive an owner of the right to use his property because 
the zoning board believes that what he plans to erect is not artistic or aesthetically pleasing.
181
 
Further, in Petition of Standard Investment Corp., the court found that it was invalid to deny a 
permit to construct a filling station in a business district for purely aesthetic reasons.
182
 The court 
determined that the ordinance did not relate to the proper scope of the police power to protect 
public health, safety, or welfare.
183
 Specifically, the court held that to be valid, ordinances “must 
not be from an arbitrary desire to resist the natural operation of economic laws or for purely 
aesthetic considerations.”184 
Rhode Island 
In City of Providence v. Stephens, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island found that 
apartment homes could be excluded from a residential district on the grounds that the exclusion 
                                                 
179
 Id.at 122. The court further noted that “[t]his ordinance flies in the face of our 
birthright of Liberty and our American Way of Life, and is interdicted by the Constitution.” Id. at 
123. 
180
 Appeal of Lord, 81 A.2d 533, 537-38 (Pa.1951). 
181
 Id. at 536 
182
 Petition of Standard Investments Corp., 19 A.2d 167, 168 (Pa.1941). 
183
 Id. 
184
 Id. (quoting Appeal of White, 134 A. 409, 412 (Pa. 1926) (“[Regulation of private 
property] must not be from an arbitrary desire to resist the natural operation of economic laws or 
for purely aesthetic considerations.”)). 
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would promote public health and safety by lessening the risk of fire and congestion.
185
 The court 
did, however specifically state that it was not upholding the ordinance on aesthetic grounds, 
noting that “private advantage or purely aesthetic considerations do not supply sufficient basis 
for the exercise of the police power.”186 Similarly, in Sundlum v. Zoning Board of Review, the 
court held that a zoning board acted improperly in denying a permit to erect a filling station in a 
residential district, because the record did not indicate that the station presented a threat to public 
health or safety.
187
 In that case, the court overturned the decision of the zoning board, because 
the board denied the permit solely on aesthetic grounds.
188
 The court reiterated that aesthetic 
considerations alone cannot justify the use of the police power.
189
 
Vermont 
In the case of Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Village of St. Johnsbury, the Supreme Court of 
Vermont was confronted with a challenge to a law that declared junkyards to be nuisances.
190
 
While the court discussed general developments in the field of zoning and nuisance law, it would 
not recognize aesthetic considerations alone to be proper bases for the exercise of the police 
power.
191
 Specifically, the court found that a junk yard could not be declared a nuisance by the 
                                                 
185
 City of Providence v. Stephens, 133 A. 614, 617-18 (R.I. 1926). 
186
 Id. at 617. 
187
 Sundlun v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 145 A. 451, 454-55 (R.I.1929). 
188
 Id.  
189
 Id. at 455. 
190
 Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Vill. of St. Johnsbury, 34 A.2d 188 (Vt. 1943). 
191
 Id. at 192-97. 
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legislature for purely aesthetic reasons.
192
 Similarly, the court noted that zoning ordinances could 
not be used to prohibit the operation of junk yards for solely aesthetic reasons.
193
 
Virginia 
The Supreme Court of Virginia decisions displayed a strongly deferential stance towards 
determinations of lawmakers; however, the court still struck down ordinances that could not be 
justified by traditional understandings of the police power. In West Brothers Brick Company v. 
City of Alexandria, the court upheld the validity of an ordinance that prohibited further 
expansion of a brick plant in a residential district.
194
 The court showed strong deference to the 
determinations of the legislature, city council, and planner in finding that the ordinance was 
related to public health, safety, and welfare.
195
 Nonetheless, the court did state that aesthetic 
considerations alone could not justify police power activity.
196
  
In City of Alexandria v. Texas Co., the court addressed the validity of an ordinance 
prohibiting the erection of floodlights on a filling station.
197
 The court did not explicitly address 
aesthetic considerations; however, the court held that ordinance was invalid. The court found that 
the ordinance did not affect public health, safety, morals, or welfare, and therefore was not a 
                                                 
192
 Id. at 197 (“It is well settled that the mere fact that a thing is unsightly and thus 
offends the aesthetic sense furnishes no valid ground for a declaration by the legislature that it is 
a nuisance.”). 
193
 See id. (“Apparently the same rule applies in this respect as to the power of a 
municipality to regulate for this reason [aesthetics] alone.”). 
194
 West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 192 S.E. 881, 890 (Va.1937). 
195
 See id. at 889-90. 
196
 Id. at 885. 
197
 City of Alexandria v. Texas Co., 1 S.E.2d 296, 297 (Va.1939). 
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proper exercise of the police power.
198
 In short, the court recognized that ordinances unrelated to 
the traditional scope of the police power were invalid. 
Maine, New Mexico, and Washington 
As identified by the search, no cases decided prior to Berman by the high courts of 
Maine, New Mexico, or Washington were relevant to the question posed by this Thesis.
 199
 
B. Berman v. Parker 
In Berman v. Parker, appellants sought to enjoin the condemnation of their property 
which was located within a Washington D.C. redevelopment zone.
200
 In seeking an injunction, 
appellants challenged the constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 
1945, Washington D.C.’s urban renewal legislation.201 The Redevelopment Act provided for the 
condemnation and transfer of private property for the “the redevelopment of blighted territory in 
the District of Columbia and the prevention, reduction, or elimination of blighting factors or 
causes of blight.”202 Further, the Act declared that “the acquisition and the assembly of real 
property and the leasing or sale thereof for redevelopment pursuant to a project area 
redevelopment plan . . . is hereby declared to be a public use.”203 Following the acquisition and 
assembly of land, the District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency was permitted to sell or 
                                                 
198
 Id. at 298-99. 
199
 Although there may have been no cases from these states that were relevant to the 
question posed by this Thesis, these cases are still included below in Appendix A with a brief 
description suggesting their irrelevance to this Thesis. 
200
 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
201
 Id. at 28. 
202
 60 Stat. 760 § 5 (1946). 
203
 Id. § 2. 
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lease the land to private developers who would develop the land in accordance with a general 
plan adopted by the National Capital Planning Commission.
204
  
Appellants’ property, used as a department store, was located within a zone deemed 
blighted and marked for redevelopment under the Act.
205
 Appellants’ property was condemned 
pursuant to the Act, but appellants challenged the action, arguing that their property was not 
blighted and therefore could not be taken.
206
 Moreover, the appellants further argued, as 
summarized by the Court, that “[t]o take for the purpose of ridding the area of slums is one thing; 
it is quite another, . . . to take a man’s property merely to develop a better balanced, more 
attractive community.”207  
The lower court was sympathetic to this argument, stating that “[o]ne man's land cannot 
be seized by the Government and sold to another man merely in order that the purchaser may 
build upon it a better house or a house which better meets the Government's idea of what is 
appropriate or well-designed.”208 Nonetheless, the lower court upheld the constitutionality of the 
Redevelopment Act by finding that the Land Agency could only condemn property for slum 
clearance, because slums were “injurious to the public health, safety, morals and welfare.”209 The 
lower court, therefore, essentially upheld the constitutionality of the Act on more traditional 
public health, safety, and welfare grounds.  
                                                 
204
 Id. § 6. 
205
 348 U.S. at 30-31. 
206
 Id. at 31. 
207
 Id. 
208
 Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705, 724 (D.D.C. 1953); 348 U.S. at 
31. 
209
 117 F. Supp. at 725. 
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The lower court remained wary of the proposition that eminent domain could be used for 
purposes beyond the protection of public health, safety, morals or welfare.
210
 In modifying the 
lower court’s decision, however, the Supreme Court of the United went further.211 The Supreme 
Court ultimately determined that even non-blighted property within a development zone could be 
taken, because such a taking was necessary to achieve the Redevelopment Act’s larger purpose 
of slum and blight clearance.
212
 The Court opined that if an individual owner “were permitted to 
resist these redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular property was not being 
used against the public interest, integrated plans for redevelopment would suffer greatly.”213 
In upholding the constitutionality of the Redevelopment Act, the Supreme Court 
professed deference to the legislature and stated that “when the legislature has spoken, the public 
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”214 Although noting that it is “fruitless” 
to define the scope of the police power, the Court essentially held that a legislature is capable of 
defining the extent of the police power.
215
 Seemingly because Congress had declared the 
acquisition and assembly of private property to be a public use, condemnation and subsequent 
transfer to redevelopment companies was a valid exercise of eminent domain in service to the 
police power, and was not in violation of the Fifth Amendment. As the Court stated, if “the 
object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent 
domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.”216  
                                                 
210
 Id. at 716-19. 
211
 348 U.S. at 35-36. 
212
 Id.  
213
 Id. at 35. 
214
 Id. at 32. 
215
 Id. 
216
 Id. at 33. 
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In determining that the Redevelopment Act was indeed instituted for the public interest, 
the Court discussed the scope of the police power and the concept of the public welfare. It noted 
that the preservation of public safety, health, morality, peace, quiet, law and order were more 
conspicuous examples of the police power.
217
 However, the Court stated that these applications 
did not delimit the police power.
218
 Asserting that disreputable housing conditions were an ugly 
sore that robbed a community of its charm, the court found that  
[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The 
Values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as 
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to 
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as 
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as 
carefully patrolled. . . . If [Congress] decide[s] that the Nation’s 
Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in 
the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
219
 
Where the District Court had upheld the constitutionality of the Act on traditional police 
power grounds, the Supreme Court went further and declared that the police power, and therefore 
eminent domain, could essentially be used to beautify a community.
220
 In its discussion, this 
Thesis seeks to explore whether this holding in Berman served as the basis for upholding historic 
zoning ordinances. If so, historic zoning, though seemingly opposed to urban renewal, would 
share fundamental legal ties to urban renewal legislation.  
                                                 
217
 Id. at 32. 
218
 Id. 
219
 Id. at 33. 
220
 See id. 
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V. JURISPRUDENCE FOLLOWING BERMAN 
Forty-five state high court decisions were identified by conducting the search for cases 
following Berman but prior to Penn Central.
221
 These cases span across nineteen states that also 
were identified in the search of cases prior to Berman. Therefore, summaries of the concept of 
historic zoning, aesthetic zoning, and the general welfare in these nineteen states, following the 
Berman decision, are contained below. While reaching mixed conclusions, many of these cases 
show that state high courts were more likely to uphold historic zoning by using the broad concept 
of the general welfare and police power derived from the Berman decision. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland held that regulation could not be used to create aesthetically pleasing results, but 
could be used to preserve aesthetically pleasing or historic sites;
222
 the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut passed on ruling directly on historic zoning, though noted that it likely was a valid 
aspect of the general welfare;
223
 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania noted that aesthetics alone 
could not serve as the sole basis for zoning, but nonetheless embraced a broad definition of 
general welfare as proposed in Berman;
224
 and, the high courts of New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
and Massachusetts embraced Berman’s broad scope of the general welfare and upheld historic 
zoning ordinances.
225
 
                                                 
221
 See supra Chapter III. 
222
 See infra notes 232-34 and accompanying text. 
223
 See infra notes 227-31 and accompanying text. 
224
 See infra notes 263-74 and accompanying text. 
225
 See infra notes 249-52, 253-58, 235-48 and accompanying text. 
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A brief summary of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York is also 
included below as the United States Supreme Court’s decision in that case is generally 
considered of great importance to historic preservation.
226
 
A. State Summaries 
Connecticut 
In Figarsky v. Historic District Commission, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed 
the decision of the local historic commission to deny a certificate of appropriateness for 
demolishing a structure within a historic zone.
227
 The court ultimately held that the historic 
commission properly denied the certificate and upheld the validity of the ordinance at issue.
228
 In 
so doing, the court cited the Berman decision and the Massachusetts Supreme Court and found 
that public welfare includes the preservation of historic areas.
229
 Although the court chose to pass 
on whether aesthetics alone is enough to justify the use of the police power, it noted that the 
concept of public welfare is very “broad and inclusive.”230 Further, it did not explicitly state that 
historic zoning served to protect public health or safety. While passing on the issue of aesthetics 
                                                 
226
 See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 11.33 (5th ed. 2003) (“Since 
Penn Central, which upheld the New York City landmarks preservation law, the courts have 
accepted the aesthetic and other regulatory purposes served by historic landmark preservation.”). 
227
 Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm’n, 368 A.2d 163, 166 (Conn. 1976) 
228
 Id. at 171-72. 
229
 Id. at 169-70 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)) (citing Op. of the 
Justices, 128 N.E.2d 557 (Mass. 1955)) (“[T]he preservation of historic areas in a static form 
serves the amorphous concept of the ‘public welfare.’”) 
230
 Id. at 170-71 (quoting 348 U.S. at 33). In quoting Berman’s language regarding 
aesthetics, the court seemed to recognize that historic zoning necessarily involved aesthetic 
considerations. Id. at 170. While the court noted that aesthetics alone may not be enough, it did 
not invalidate the regulations at issue, because they were neither vague nor undefined. Id. 
Moreover, the court “indicated that aesthetic considerations may have a definite relation to the 
public welfare.” Id. at 171 (citations omitted).  
 47 
 
alone, it nonetheless seemed to base its decision almost entirely on an expansive understanding 
of “public welfare” that includes historic and aesthetic considerations.231 
Maryland 
The search returned no cases decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland that directly 
addressed historic zoning. However, some cases addressing billboard regulations were identified. 
In these cases, the Maryland court struck down local ordinances that prohibited the erection of 
billboards or painted signs.
232
 While a full analysis of the aesthetic implications of the ordinances 
was not necessary for the court to reach its holdings, it nonetheless stated that aesthetics alone 
could not justify the use of the police power to restrict the erection of billboards or painted 
signs.
233
 However, in Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Schwartz, Inc., the court recognized that 
aesthetic considerations did play a proper role when used for preservation. The court stated that 
“the police power may rightly be exercised to preserve an area which is generally regarded by 
the public to be pleasing to the eye or historically or architecturally significant.”234 
Massachusetts 
Following Berman, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued opinions that 
directly covered aesthetic and historic zoning regulations. In John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. 
Outdoor Advertising Board, the court upheld the locality’s decision to deny plaintiff’s permit for 
                                                 
231
 See id. at 169-71. 
232
 Mayor of Balitmore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 299 A.2d 828 (Md.1973); City of Baltimore 
v. Charles Center Parking, Inc., 271 A.2d 144 (Md.1970). 
233
 See 299 A.2d at 832 (noting that aesthetic goals may only serve an additional purpose 
if health, morals, or safety are already being served); 271 A.2d at 146-48. 
234
 299 A.2d at 835. 
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off-premises outdoor advertising signs.
235
 The court noted that it is not possible to fix firm limits 
to the police power, and explicitly concluded “that aesthetics alone may justify the exercise of 
the police power; that within the broad concept of ‘general welfare,’ cities and towns may enact 
reasonable bill-board regulations designed to preserve and improve their physical 
environment.”236 In reaching this conclusion, the court cited language in Berman for the 
proposition “that the general welfare embraces aesthetic considerations.”237 Moreover the court 
noted that “[a]lthough Berman involved the use of eminent domain, this expansive view of the 
general welfare is applicable to the zoning power.”238 The Massachusetts court thus adopted 
Berman’s entanglement of the police power and eminent domain, effectively recognizing that if a 
government has authority to act under one power it also has authority to act under the other. 
Furthermore the court noted that the increased weight given to aesthetic considerations was 
related to historic zoning.
239
 
The Massachusetts court also directly addressed the constitutionality of historic zoning in 
two separate opinions which answered questions posed by the Massachusetts Senate.
240
 In both 
                                                 
235
 John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709, 720-21 
(Mass.1975) 
236
 Id. at 717. 
237
 Id. at 717 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)). 
238
 Id. 
239
 Id. at 718 (citing Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557 (Mass. 1955)) (“In 
expressing the opinion that the proposed legislation establishing historic districts in the town of 
Nantucket was constitutional, the court noted the growing tendency to give more weight to 
aesthetic considerations.”). 
240
 Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1955) (recognizing the 
validity of the Beacon Hill historic act); 128 N.E.2d 557 (recognizing the validity of the 
Nantucket historic act). In these two opinions, the court did not actually uphold the validity of 
the historic zoning law as applied in a case brought by a plaintiff. The court did, however, 
generally uphold the validity of such laws in answering questions posed by the Massachusetts 
Senate. 
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instances, the court suggested that historic district zoning was constitutional.
241
 The court 
extensively discussed aesthetic zoning and its relationship to historic zoning.
242
 The court 
specifically discussed earlier decisions that held that aesthetic considerations alone could not 
justify the exercise of the police power, because the police power and zoning must relate directly 
to public health and safety and less directly to public morals.
243
 The court even noted that the 
proposed historic zoning act could “hardly be said in any ordinary sense to relate to the public 
safety, health, or morals.”244 
However, the court went on to discuss how earlier decisions restricting zoning to 
situations that addressed public health, safety, or morals were decided prior to the “general 
acceptance” of extensive zoning restrictions.245 Directly citing Berman, the Massachusetts court 
stated that “[t]here is reason to think that more weight might now be given to aesthetic 
considerations than was given to them [in the early twentieth century].”246 The court then went 
on to note how the construction of “incongruous structures” could destroy the historic character 
of the town.
247
 Ultimately, based on an expanding conception of the police power and the public 
welfare, as embraced in Berman, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts concluded that the historic 
district zoning act would be constitutional.
248
 
                                                 
241
 128 N.E.2d at 567 (Beacon Hill); 128 N.E.2d at 562 (Nantucket). The opinion 
discussing the Beacon Hill district used the same analysis as the opinion discussing the 
Nantucket district, and referred to the Nantucket opinion without reiterating it. 128 N.E.2d at 
567. Therefore, footnotes 221 through 227 will cite to the Nantucket opinion only. 
242
 128 N.E.2d at 561-61. 
243
 Id. at 561. 
244
 Id. 
245
 Id. 
246
 Id. (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)). 
247
 Id. at 562. 
248
 Id. 
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New Hampshire 
Following Berman, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire explicitly held that historic 
zoning was within the scope of the police power.
249
 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
analogized historic zoning to aesthetic regulations.
250
 The court cited the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court’s Opinion of the Justices to the Senate for the proposition that aesthetic and historic zoning 
was within the scope of the police power.
251
 It is important to note that the New Hampshire court 
cited the Opinion of the Justices, because that opinion in turn directly cited to Berman for 
justification to find historic zoning valid.
252
 
New Mexico 
In Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., the Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the 
conviction of a landowner for violating an ordinance that required only certain windows be used 
for structures in a historic district.
253
 In upholding the conviction, the court generally upheld the 
validity of the ordinance.
254
 The court declined to discuss whether aesthetics alone could be the 
basis for zoning, but did mention that, under the precedent set in Berman, this was an 
accelerating trend.
255
 Nonetheless, in upholding the ordinance, the court did discuss the 
importance of aesthetics to historic neighborhoods and the importance of historic neighborhoods 
                                                 
249
 Town of Deering ex rel Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 202 A.2d 232, 234 (N.H. 1964) 
(“That such a purpose is a generally recognized basis for the exercise of the police power is now 
too well established to be open to question.”) (citation omitted). 
250
 See id. at 234-35.  
251
 Id. at 236 (citing Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557, 562 (Mass. 1955)). 
252
 See supra notes 220-28 and accompanying text. 
253
 City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13, 19 (N.M. 1964). 
254
 Id. at 18. 
255
 See id. at 17-18 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)). 
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to tourism.
256
 The court determined, therefore, that historic zoning was a valid exercise of the 
police power, in part at least because it helped provide for tourism revenue.
257
 Further, New 
Mexico Supreme Court discussed the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s Opinion of the Justices in 
reaching the conclusion that historic zoning was a valid exercise of the police power.
258
 
New York 
In Lutheran Church v. New York, the Court of Appeals of New York adjudicated a case 
in which the plaintiff landowner challenged the designation of its property as a historic 
landmark.
259
 The court’s ultimate holding was that the designation could not be upheld as a non-
confiscatory use of the police power, because the owner was essentially denied all economically 
viable use of his property under the requirement that the property not be demolished.
260
 In 
reaching this holding, it was unnecessary for the court to address the issue of aesthetic or historic 
zoning.  
The dissent, however, sought to uphold the landmark designation and noted that 
landmark laws, while leaning heavily on economic justifications – for example, that they 
promote tourism or protect property values – serve the primary purpose of protecting aesthetic 
and historic properties.
261
 In this discussion, the dissent suggested that perhaps it was time that 
aesthetics was seen as a valid justification of the police power in and of itself, because “historic 
                                                 
256
 Id. at 15. 
257
 Id. at 18 (“New Mexico is particularly dependent upon its scenic beauty to attract the 
host of visitors, the income from whose visits is a vital factor in our economy.”). 
258
 Id. at 17-18 (citing Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557 (Mass. 1955)); 
see supra notes 220-28 and accompanying text. 
259
 Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1955). 
260
 Id. at 312. 
261
 Id. at 313 & n.4 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
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preservation promotes aesthetic values by adding to the variety, the beauty and the quality of 
life.”262 
Pennsylvania 
In Best v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the 
validity of an ordinance establishing a single family residential zone as applied to a structure 
with twenty two bedrooms and seven baths.
263
 In upholding the ordinance, the court extensively 
quoted from Berman for the proposition that the concept of the general welfare is broad and that 
it encompasses aesthetics.
264
 The court also quoted from the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s 
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate for the proposition that historic zoning as well fell within 
the scope of the general welfare and the police power.
265
 The court further stated that if the 
legislature can compel the sale of a property to create a more attractive community, it can 
certainly regulate property to create a more attractive community.
266
 Ultimately, the court 
determined that  
not only is the preservation of the attractive characteristics of a 
community a proper element of the general welfare, but also the 
preservation of property values is a legitimate consideration since 
“[A]nything that tends to destroy property values of the inhabitants 
of the [community] necessarily adversely affects the prosperity, 
and therefore the general welfare, of the entire [community].”267 
                                                 
262
 Id. 
263
 Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 606, 608, 613 (Pa. 1958). 
264
 Id. at 612-13(citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-33 (1954)). 
265
 Id. at 611-12 (quoting Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561 (Mass. 
1955)). 
266
 Id. at 612. 
267
 Id. at 612-13 (quoting State ex rel Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 69 
N.W.2d 217, 222 (Wis. 1955)). 
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In National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
declared invalid an ordinance that established minimum lot sizes.
268
 The locality defending the 
ordinance argued that it was necessary to preserve the historic and aesthetically pleasing, rural 
environment in the locality.
269
 The court found, however, that the ordinance was not in the 
interests of the general welfare because it essentially served to protect the interests of landowners 
already residing on larger lots within the locality.
270
 The police power, therefore, could not be 
used because the ordinance did not relate to public health, safety, or welfare.
271
 In reaching this 
holding, the court explicitly noted in a footnote that “zoning may not be sustained solely on the 
basis of aesthetic considerations.”272 
In Shapp v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania found that a state constitutional provision making the state a protector in trust of 
aesthetic and historic sites in the state was not self-executing, but required further legislation in 
order to prohibit development near historic sites.
273
 While the case does not involve a challenge 
to the validity of an ordinance, it is nonetheless important to report because the court specifically 
                                                 
268
 Nat’l Land & Inv.Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 612-23 (Pa. 1965). 
269
 Id. at 611. 
270
 See id. at 612. 
271
 See id. at 606-13. The court, however, discussed how the holding did “not mean that 
individual action is foreclosed.” Id. at 612. The court noted that an individual was still free to 
“singly or with his neighbors, purchase sufficient neighboring land to protect and preserve by 
restrictions in deeds or by covenants inter se, the privacy, a minimum acreage, the quiet peaceful 
atmosphere and the tone and character of the community which existed when he or they moved 
there.” Id. at 612-13 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).  
272
 Id. at 610 n.9. 
273
 Shapp v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 595 (Pa. 1973). 
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stated that through the new constitutional provision, “the Commonwealth has been given power 
to act in areas of purely aesthetic or historic concern.”274  
Virginia 
In Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed an ordinance 
that established architectural design review regulations.
275
 The case is relevant to this Thesis to 
the extent that the court ultimately found that a locality could not use the police power for solely 
aesthetic purposes.
276
 The court’s decision, however, was based largely on the fact that the 
ordinances were outside of the scope of the pertinent enabling legislation.
277
 The court 
specifically noted that the Code of Virginia permitted the creation of historic districts and design 
guidelines under certain circumstances.
278
 The ordinance at issue was invalid because it failed to 
conform to the guidelines of that legislation.
279
 
Washington  
In Department of Ecology v. Pacesetter Construction Co., Inc., the Supreme Court of 
Washington found that the police power could be used to protect aesthetics when it also served to 
protect against economic loss.
280
 The court, therefore, passed on deciding whether the police 
                                                 
274
 Id. at 592. 
275
 Bd. of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 S.E.2d 199 (Va. 1975). 
276
 Id. at 213. 
277
 Id. 
278
 Id. 
279
 See id.  
280
 Dep’t of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., Inc., 571 P.2d 196, 201-02 (Wash. 1977) 
(en banc). 
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power could be invoked for aesthetic considerations alone.
281
 This case was of little relevance to 
this Thesis as it involved environmental legislation rather than historic zoning. 
Arkansas, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, and Vermont 
As identified by the search, no cases decided after Berman by the high courts of 
Arkansas, California, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Rhode 
Island, or Vermont were relevant to the question posed by this Thesis.
282
 
B. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York  
Finally, in addition to state courts that addressed the issue of historic zoning, the Supreme 
Court of the United States addressed the issue on June 26, 1978, in the case of Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York.
283
 While Penn Central is famous for its applications to 
inverse condemnation and takings analyses, it also served to generally recognize the validity of 
historic district zoning ordinances and landmark ordinances.
284
 Before reaching its holding on 
                                                 
281
 See id. at 201. 
282
 Although there may have been no cases from these states that were relevant to the 
question posed by this Thesis, these cases are still included below in Appendix B with a brief 
description suggesting their irrelevance to this Thesis. 
283
 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  
284
 It is useful to note that the lower court had determined that this case was not about 
general historic district zoning, but rather about the designation of individual structures as 
landmarks. See id. at 138 & n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority, however, in upholding 
the designation and finding that no taking had occurred, generally found that landmark 
designation was similar to historic districting and essentially linked the two concepts. The 
majority, for example, noted that the landmark designation had been applied to all the structures 
in New York’s thirty one historic districts in addition to four hundred other individual 
landmarks. See 438 U.S. 104, 134. The majority equated the burdens on these properties to those 
felt by properties under zoning regulations. Id. at 133-34. While the appellants did not challenge 
the landmark ordinance on the grounds that it was an improper use of zoning, the majority 
discussed the landmark ordinance within the context of general zoning regulations stating that 
while the Landmark Ordinance “has a more severe impact on some landowners than on others . . 
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the takings issue, the Court cited Berman and noted that “States and cities may enact land-use 
restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and desirable 
aesthetic features of a city.”285 The Court also recognized that the landmark ordinance was a 
valid exercise of the police power, similar to historic zoning, because it “embodie[d] a 
comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might be 
found in the city.”286  
The Court also generally recognized the validity of historic zoning, noting that 
appellants’ arguments would not stand if New York had encumbered the property with historic 
district legislation.
287
 In making this recognition, the Supreme Court approvingly cited Maher v. 
City of New Orleans, a Fifth Circuit case that generally found that Berman could be used to 
justify historic zoning as within the scope of the police power.
288
  
Finally, the majority in Penn Central did not find that the landmark ordinance’s 
requirement to keep property in good repair went beyond the permissible scope of regulatory 
activity.
289
 However, such a requirement, as Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent burdened 
                                                                                                                                                             
. [s]imilarly, zoning laws often affect some property owners more severely than others but have 
not been held to be invalid on that account.” Id. 
285
 438 U.S. at 129 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)) (other citations 
omitted). 
286
 Id. at 132. 
287
 Id. at 131 (citing Maher v. New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975)) (“Appellants, 
moreover, also do not dispute that a showing of diminution in property value would not establish 
a taking if the restriction had been imposed as a result of historic-district legislation.”). 
288
 Id.; see 516 F.2d at 1060, 1063-64, 1067 (“Proper state purposes may encompass not 
only the goal of abating undesirable conditions, but of fostering ends the community deems 
worthy.”) (“Although it primarily concerned a taking, Berman v. Parker supplies an apt analogy 
to the present situation.”) (“The Vieux Carre Ordinance was enacted to pursue the legitimate 
state goal of preserving the “tout ensemble” of the historic French Quarter.”). 
289
 See 438 U.S. at 137-38. 
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appellants with “an affirmative duty, backed by criminal fines and penalties.”290 Extending the 
majority’s rationale Justice Rehnquist opined that where the government desires to preserve 
private land for public use, “it need not condemn the property but need merely order that it be 
preserved in its present form and be kept ‘in good repair.’”291   
                                                 
290
 Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
291
 Id. at 146 n. 9 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
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VI. DISCUSSION  
Two of the most important tools in a local government’s toolkit are the police power and 
eminent domain. These tools are theoretically distinct from each other; however, court decisions 
since the beginning of the twentieth century have lessened the barrier between the two powers. In 
1954, the United States Supreme Court rendered a decision in Berman v. Parker that conflated 
the outer bounds of the police power as those of eminent domain.
292
 In that case, the Court 
essentially determined that a locality may exercise the power of eminent domain for any purpose 
that it could regulate with the police power.
293
 Effectively, the Court expanded and reinterpreted 
the Fifth Amendment’s requirement that eminent domain only be exercised for “public use.”294 
Rather, in upholding Urban Renewal activity that involved eminent domain, the Court began to 
expand the concept of public use so as to be coterminous with the police power.
295
 Within the 
context of eminent domain however, this expansion presents a problem because, as many courts 
have noted, the police power should not necessarily have set limitations.
296
 
                                                 
292
 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
293
 See id. (“Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the rights to realize it 
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent domain is merely the 
means to the end.”). 
294
 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation”). 
295
 Id. at 32-33; see supra notes 199-201; see also Lavine, supra note 14 (quoting D. 
Benjamin Barros, Nothing “Errant” About it: The Berman and Midkiff Conference Notes and 
How the Supreme Court got to Kelo With its Eyes Wide Open, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 57, 64 & N.38, 66 (Robin Paul Malloy, ed. 
2008)) (“[T]he Court’s focus was to ‘link the permissible scope of eminent domain [to] the broad 
scope of the police power.’ Applying the ‘virtually limitless scope of the police power’ to the 
power of eminent domain was consistent with the Court’s gradual acceptance of a broad 
interpretation of the Public Use Clause.”). 
296
 See, e.g., 348 U.S. at 32 (“An attempt to define [the Police Power’s] reach or trace its 
outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts.”); Gorieb v. Fox, 134 S.E. 914, 
916 (Va.1926) (“The extent of this power is difficult to define, but it is elastic and expands 
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Traditionally, the police power was seen as the power of a government body to pass laws 
that provide for the public health, safety, morals, and welfare. Courts were hesitant to declare 
hard limits to the police power, recognizing that changing times and conditions may require a 
more or less expansive understanding of the power. Nonetheless, for the first half of the 
Twentieth Century, the police power was understood to have the effective limitation that it must 
only be exercised for the public health, safety, morals, or welfare; courts were hesitant to expand 
that limitation, abridging private property rights in the process. While discussing the police 
power in the Berman decision, however, the United States Supreme Court stated that  
the concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . The 
Values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as 
well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to 
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as 
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as 
carefully patrolled.
297
 
The question that this discussion seeks to answer is: Did the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Berman lead to the validation of historic zoning ordinances where before they may not have been 
valid? In short, are the legal justifications for urban renewal espoused by the Supreme Court in 
Berman fundamentally related to the legal justifications for historic zoning? 
                                                                                                                                                             
automatically to protect the public against the improper use of private property to the injury of 
the public interest.”); Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 193 N.E. 799, 812 
(Mass.1935) (“These rules and regulations were promulgated in the exercise of the police power. 
This court has never undertaken to define that power.”); cf. Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 
N.E.2d 557, 561 (Mass. 1955) (“The term public welfare has never been and cannot be precisely 
defined.”). But cf. Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A. 50, 54 (Md. 1925) (“While it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to define precisely the limits of the police power, there must in the very nature of 
things be some limit to it, for otherwise the guaranties of written Constitutions would be little 
more than mere precatory and directory suggestions without force or life, affording to the citizen 
only a false and illusory protection against the invasion of his rights by the state, and his security 
would depend, not upon constitutional guaranties, but upon the will of the state in exercising an 
unlimited police power.”). 
297
 Id. at 33. 
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C. Overview prior to Berman 
The initial search for cases relating to historic zoning ordinances prior to Berman did not 
return any results. The lack of results could be due to several factors, or any combination of 
them. For example, it is possible that historic zoning ordinances were not in widespread use in 
the years prior to the Berman decision. Alternatively, ordinances could have been in use, but may 
not have been widely challenged. Regardless, the lack of results required that analogous cases 
prior to Berman be identified so as to compare the effects that Berman had on the concept of the 
general welfare and historic zoning in particular. For this reason, cases dealing with aesthetic 
zoning prior to Berman were identified and analyzed. Aesthetic zoning cases were chosen 
because historic zoning has generally been recognized as a form of aesthetic regulation.
298
 As 
outlined above in Chapter Four, fifteen of the nineteen states identified through the search 
parameters would not recognize zoning on the basis of aesthetic considerations alone.
299
 One 
state, however, demonstrated a conflicted view of aesthetic and historic zoning, suggesting that 
where such regulations also served to promote economic health, they would be valid. The results 
generated for the three other states were largely irrelevant to the question being posed by this 
Thesis.
300
 
The cases from the sixteen relevant states revealed a general consensus that aesthetic 
considerations alone could not serve as the justification for a zoning ordinance.
301
 Some courts 
went further stating that aesthetics could never serve as a justification for zoning ordinances. 
                                                 
298
 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
299
 As discussed above, the nineteen states included for analysis and discussion were 
chosen because they were represented in the search results for cases both prior to and following 
Berman. See supra Chapter III. 
300
 See supra note 199 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix A. 
301
 But see infra notes 319-24 (discussing the decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court 
prior to Berman). 
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Other courts suggested ordinances properly grounded in health, safety, or welfare justifications 
would not be declared invalid simply because they also touched on aesthetic concerns. Similarly, 
some courts held that it was proper to consider aesthetic implications, but only if the ordinance 
could independently be upheld on other grounds. Cases from Massachusetts, New York, 
Pennsylvania, and Louisiana provided particularly interesting insights into the state of aesthetic 
zoning prior to Berman.  
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, for example, specifically overturned the opinion of 
the trial judge in Barney and Casey v. Milton, because that judge upheld a zoning ordinance on 
the basis of aesthetic considerations.
302
 The trial judge had determined that if a district located 
near the entrance to the town were zoned as commercial, the commercial buildings “may well 
give one approaching the town a wrong impression of the residential character of the town.”303 
The Supreme Court, however, noted that such an aesthetic consideration could not be used as the 
basis of a zoning ordinance.
304
 In a statement that is very relevant to the application of historic 
zoning later, the Massachusetts Supreme Court further noted that “[r]egard for the preservation 
of the natural beauty of a neighborhood makes the enactment of a zoning regulation desirable but 
does not itself give vitality to the regulation.”305 
The Court of Appeals of New York made a similar finding in Dowsey v. Village of 
Kensington.
306
 In that case, the city had adopted a zoning ordinance that zoned nearly the entire 
                                                 
302
 Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 87 N.E.2d 9, 14-15 (Mass.1949). 
303
 Id. at 14. 
304
 Id. at 14-15 
305
 Id. at 15. 
306
 Dowsey v. Vill. of Kensington, 177 N.E. 427, 430 (N.Y. 1931). 
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city exclusively as a single family detached residential zone.
307
 The court found that this 
ordinance was adopted with the apparent intention “of providing a beautiful and dignified village 
frontage on the public thoroughfare.”308 While noting that such considerations “need not be 
disregarded in the formulation of regulations to promote the public welfare,” the court 
nonetheless held that even the widest extension of the police power could not be used to justify 
an ordinance with purely aesthetic considerations.
309
 Thus, the high courts of both New York and 
Massachusetts specifically held that the police power cannot be used to embrace ordinances that 
have the sole purpose of providing a more beautiful village frontage. 
Similarly, 122 Main Street v. Brockton dealt with issues that are quite analogous to 
historic zoning.
310
 In interpreting the contemporary zooning enabling act, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court approvingly quoted earlier cases for the proposition that the police power cannot 
be exercised for purely aesthetic reasons.
311
 In this specific case, the court determined that a 
minimum height ordinance was invalid under the enabling act and prior aesthetic 
jurisprudence.
312
 In reaching its holding, the court specifically rejected the city’s argument that 
the ordinance was necessary “to ensure a reasonable permanency to the character of the districts 
in conformity with its initial establishment.”313 In rejecting that argument, the court stated that 
“[i]t is not within the scope of the [enabling] act to enact zoning regulations for the purpose of 
                                                 
307
 See id. 
308
 Id. 
309
 Id. at 430-31. 
310
 122 Main St. Corp. v. City of Brockton, 84 N.E.2d 13, 16 (Mass.1949). 
311
 Id. at 15-16. 
312
 Id. at 16. 
313
 Id. at 15. 
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assisting a municipality to retain or assume a general appearance deemed to be ideal, or to inflate 
its taxable revenue.”314 Further, the court noted that  
where legislation seeks to force land to remain vacant unless the 
owner will erect a structure of at least two stories . . . or will not 
permit him to remodel an existing structure except under the same 
conditions, the general benefit to the community must be 
something more tangible and less nebulous than any supposed 
advantages which the city has been able to bring forward in this 
case.
315
  
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court similarly found that an ordinance establishing 
minimum lot sizes was unconstitutional as an invalid use of the police power. In Appeal of 
Medinger, the court strongly declared that neither aesthetic considerations nor the protection of 
property values nor the protection of the local economy had any relation to promoting the health, 
safety, morals, or general welfare of a community.
316
 In short, the court denounced the 
proposition that the police power could be used to deny a property owner rights in his property 
for purely aesthetic considerations. Moreover, neither aesthetics nor the conservation of 
economic or property value fell within the scope of the general welfare.
317
 Again in two further 
cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an owner could not be deprived by zoning of 
the right to either erect a radio tower or construct a filling station, simply because those uses 
offended the aesthetic sensibilities of others.
318
 
The major exception to this general rule comes from a 1953 Louisiana Case in which the 
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld what was essentially a historic zoning ordinance that preserved 
                                                 
314
 Id. at 16. 
315
 Id. 
316
 Appeal of Medinger, 104 A.2d 118, 122-23 (Pa.1954). 
317
 See id. 
318
 Appeal of Lord, 81 A.2d 533, 537-38 (Pa.1951); Petition of Standard Investments 
Corp., 19 A.2d 167, 168 (Pa.1941). 
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the appearance of the Vieux Carre district of New Orleans.
319
 The court upheld the ordinance 
because the Constitution of Louisiana had been amended to specifically provide for its 
creation.
320
 However, the court also noted that the ordinance would tend to promote tourism, and 
therefore, the commercial value of the city.
321
 Nonetheless, the court did note in passing that 
“[p]erhaps esthetic considerations alone would not warrant an imposition of the several 
restrictions contained in the Vieux Carre Commission Ordinance.”322 The Louisiana court, 
therefore, was unique in generally recognizing that such ordinances were within the scope of the 
police power, prior to Berman. In recognizing the validity, however, the court did note that the 
Louisiana Constitution and the ordinance “recite that preservation is for the public welfare.”323 
While, therefore, this decision came down prior to Berman, it nonetheless did use the same 
justification for historic zoning as Berman did for urban renewal; that is, a broader definition of 
public welfare.
324
 
Nonetheless, despite Louisiana’s position, these highlighted cases together demonstrate a 
general rule that prior to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Berman, aesthetic 
considerations alone could not be used as the basis for zoning ordinances.
325
 Moreover, the cases 
have interesting parallels to historic zoning, which strongly indicate that historic zoning would 
                                                 
319
 City of New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So.2d 798 (La. 1953). 
320
 Id. at 799. 
321
 Id. at 801-03. 
322
 Id. at 803. 
323
 Id. 
324
 See supra notes 200-20 and accompanying text (discussing Berman v. Parker). 
325
 This rule is deemed general on the basis of the states represented in this Thesis’ 
discussion and table of cases. Although Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania are 
highlighted here, the high courts of twelve other states mentioned above reached similar 
conclusions, as outlined in Chapter Four. The major exception was the Louisiana Supreme Court. 
It stated that aesthetics alone could not justify the use of the police power, but it did uphold what 
was essentially a historic zoning ordinance, because it promoted tourism. 
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have generally been suspect prior to Berman.
326
 The ordinances at issue in these cases seemed to 
have the objective of preserving the existing physical environment of the city and prohibiting any 
land uses that were deemed in opposition to the apparent existing beauty of the cities. The 
ordinances sought to preserve the appearance of city centers by prohibiting single story 
structures, to ensure aesthetically pleasing village frontages, to preserve the character of the town 
as initially existed, or to maintain the general residential character of certain districts. The courts 
consistently noted that these objectives could not be accomplished through the use of the police 
power. While the courts noted that these aesthetic considerations could be auxiliary to the 
primary purpose of the ordinances, they could not serve as the basis.  
Considering that many of the invalidated ordinances sought to preserve the existing 
aesthetic fabric of their jurisdiction, it is likely that courts would have similarly rejected 
ordinances that were based on preserving historic structures or districts for aesthetic reasons. 
Moreover, the language used by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggests that even had such 
aesthetic ordinances also served to preserve property values, they would have still been invalid. 
This further point indicates an early reluctance to extend the police power or the concept of the 
general welfare so as to include economic considerations. Recognizing a more limited scope for 
the police power, the court consistently held that regulations must bear some relationship to the 
public health, safety, or welfare to be valid. Aesthetic considerations did not fall into this rubric. 
                                                 
326
 Again, this conclusion is made on the basis of cases herein identified. Circumstances 
obviously would vary by state, especially depending on specific enabling legislation. Cf. infra 
notes 319-24 and accompanying text (discussing the state of the law in Louisiana prior to 
Berman). Nonetheless the conclusions drawn here do indicate a general reluctance on the part of 
courts to extend the police power so as to include aesthetic considerations (and presumably had 
the issue arisen, historic zoning) alone.  
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Similarly, it is quite likely that most courts would have held that historic zoning also did not fall 
into this rubric, as existed prior to Berman. 
D. Overview following Berman 
As outlined above in Chapter Five, the search for cases relating to historic zoning 
ordinances following Berman but prior to Penn Central returned forty five cases from the high 
courts of nineteen states that also returned results prior to Berman.
327
 Nine of the nineteen state 
high courts identified issued opinions directly applicable to the question posed by this Thesis; the 
results generated for the ten other states were largely irrelevant to the question.
328
  
Connecticut recognized a generally broad view of the general welfare and police power, 
but would not extend it to solely aesthetic considerations.
329
 Virginia invalidated design review 
restrictions, stating that the police power cannot be used for aesthetics alone.
330
 Washington 
found that in an environmental context, the police power could be used to protect aesthetics 
when it also protected against economic loss.
331
 New York did not rule directly on the validity of 
aesthetic or historic zoning regulations, but had a strong dissent that suggested it was time to 
adopt an aesthetics alone rule.
332
 Pennsylvania recognized the validity of historic zoning per the 
state constitution, and cited Berman for the proposition that the concept of the general welfare 
encompasses aesthetics, but nonetheless would not recognize that aesthetics alone could justify 
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 See supra Chapter V. 
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 See supra note 282 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix B. 
329
 See supra notes 227-31 and accompanying text. 
330
 See supra notes 275-79. This case did not, however, involve a challenge to a historic 
district ordinance, which the court did recognize was specifically provided for by statute. See Bd. 
of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (Va. 1975). 
331
 See supra notes 280-81. As with the Virginia case, the Washington case did not 
involve a challenge to a historic district ordinance. See Dep’t of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. 
Co., Inc., 571 P.2d 196 (Wash. 1977) (en banc). 
332
 See supra notes 259-62 and accompanying text. 
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use of the police power.
333
 Maryland held that regulation could not be used to create aesthetically 
pleasing results, but could be used to preserve aesthetically pleasing or historic sites.
334
 
Massachusetts, New Mexico, and New Hampshire found historic and aesthetic zoning to be valid 
exercises of the police power per language in Berman.
335
 Together, these cases identified reveal a 
mixed reaction to and use of the Supreme Court’s decision in Berman, as relates to historic 
zoning.  
The New York case Lutheran Church v. New York is somewhat irrelevant to the 
discussion in this Thesis, because the direct issue was a takings challenge to landmark 
designation.
336
 Therefore, the majority did not need to rule on the general validity of historic 
zoning to reach its conclusion that a takings had occurred.
337
 The case is highlighted here, 
however, because two dissenters expressed the sentiment that “perhaps it is time that aesthetics 
took its place as a zoning and Independently cognizable under the police power.”338 The dissent 
further noted how such a recognition would “be but a moderate analogical extension” of existing 
precedent.
339
 
In Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc. and City of Baltimore v. Center Parking, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland generally discussed the validity of aesthetic-based regulations 
when striking down two separate ordinances relating to the prohibition of billboards and painted 
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 See supra notes 263-74 and accompanying text. 
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 See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text. 
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 See supra notes 235-48, 253-58, 249-52 and accompanying text. 
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 Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1955). 
337
 See id. at 306-12. 
338
 Id. at 314 n.4 (Jasen, J., dissenting). 
339
 Id. (citations omitted). 
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signs.
 340
 In Center Parking, the earlier case, the court found that the near total prohibition of 
painted signs, but not billboards, was an arbitrary use of the police power.
341
 This decision, 
however, did not require the court to rule directly on the issue of ordinances based solely on 
aesthetics.
342
  
Three years later in Mano Swartz, however, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
where an ordinance has “as its sole purpose the achievement of an aesthetically pleasing result,” 
it is not within the permissible scope of the police power.
343
 The court found that a sign 
ordinance which established guidelines and embowered a sign commission to enact rules and 
regulations to ensure the attractiveness of signs was invalid, because it only sought to achieve an 
aesthetically pleasing result.
344
 As with earlier cases, the court noted that aesthetic goals may be 
considered only when the ordinance primarily served other ends traditionally associated with the 
police power, such as health, safety, morals, and welfare.
345
  
While the court was strict with its aesthetic only zoning language, it went on to discuss 
the preservation and protection of aesthetically pleasing areas, such as historic districts, even 
though seemingly unnecessary to the holding.
346
 The court seemed to distinguish between the 
ordinance at issue which sought to establish controls for future signage and other ordinances 
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 Mayor of Baltimore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 299 A.2d 828 (Md.1973); City of Baltimore 
v. Charles Center Parking, Inc., 271 A.2d 144 (Md.1970). 
341
 271 A.2d at 146-48. 
342
 See 271 A.2d at 147 n. 2 (“Our decision here does not require us to  reach the question 
whether aesthetic considerations alone are sufficient justification for the regulation of outdoor 
advertising . . .”). 
343
 299 A.2d at 832. 
344
 Id. at 831-33. 
345
 Id. at 832. 
346
 Id. at 832-35. 
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which sought to preserve historic or aesthetically significant areas.
347
 Indeed, the court 
specifically stated that “the police power may rightly be exercised to preserve an area which is 
generally regarded by the public to be pleasing to the eye or historically or architecturally 
significant.”348 
In Figarsky v. Historic District Commission, the Connecticut Supreme Court would not 
directly hold that aesthetics alone could justify the use of the police power.
349
 Nonetheless, the 
court upheld the validity of a historic district ordinance and affirmed the denial of a certificate to 
demolition a structure within a historic district.
350
 After quoting from Berman, the court 
determined that “the preservation of an area or cluster of buildings with exceptional historical 
and architectural significance may serve the public welfare.”351 The court also seemed to 
recognize that historic zoning involved aesthetic considerations. Plaintiffs had argued that the 
ordinance was improperly “vague aesthetic legislation;” however, the court noted that the 
historic ordinance’s aesthetic considerations were not in fact vague, because the ordinance laid 
out specific factors to be considered for the issuance of a certificate of appropriateness.
352
 The 
court then went on to note that the full extent of the relationship between the police power and 
aesthetics was not yet a settled question.
353
 Despite its apparent hesitation to recognize the 
validity of ordinances on aesthetic grounds alone, the court nonetheless upheld the validity of a 
                                                 
347
 Id. at 835 (“Because the purpose of the Ordinance was not the preservation or 
protection of something which was aesthetically pleasing, but rather was intended to achieve by 
regulation an aesthetically pleasing result, with no thought of enhancing the public welfare, we 
shall not disturb the result reached below [which invalidated the ordinance].”). 
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 Id. 
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 See Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm’n., 138 A.2d 163, 170-71 (Conn. 1976). 
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 Id. at 171-72. 
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 Id. at 169-70 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)). 
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 Id. at 170. 
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historic ordinance, at least in part, due to language in Berman stating that the public welfare 
encompasses aesthetics and that the legislature has the power to determine that a community 
should be beautiful.
354
 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reached similar conclusions, as to aesthetic zoning, in 
the cases it decided. In 1965, when invalidating an ordinance establishing minimum lot sizes, the 
court specifically stated that zoning may not be sustained with solely aesthetic justifications.
355
 
However, in a 1958 case, the court held that the designation of a structure with twenty two rooms 
and seven baths as single family residential was not an invalid exercise of the police power, 
because the legislature possessed the power to regulate to create an attractive community.
356
 
In reaching this holding, the court noted that historic zoning had elsewhere been upheld 
under a broad concept of the general welfare.
357
 It extended that broad concept of the general 
welfare to the present case, finding that “the preservation of the attractive characteristics of a 
community [is] a proper element of the general welfare.”358 In extending the scope of the general 
welfare and the police power, the court approvingly quoted Berman and went on to state that 
“[i]f the legislature has the power to compel a property owner to submit to a forced sale for the 
purposes of creating an attractive community, it has the power to regulate his property for such 
                                                 
354
 Id. at 169-70 (quoting 348 U.S. at 33). 
355
 Nat’l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, [] n.29 (Pa. 1965). Later, in Shapp v. 
National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., the court did note that the Pennsylvania Constitution 
had been amended to provide that the people have a right to the “historic and esthetic values of 
the environment.” 311 A.2d 588, 591 (Pa. 1973) (quoting Penn. Const. Art. 1, § 27). That 
provision allowed “aesthetic or historic considerations, by themselves, . . . [to be] considered 
sufficient to constitute a basis for the . . . exercise of [the] police power.” Id. at 592.   
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 Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 606 (Pa. 1958.) 
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 Id. at 611-612 (citing Op. of the Justices, 128 N.E.2d 557,561 (Mass. 1957). 
358
 Id. at 612. Moreover, the court noted that “the preservation of property values is a 
legitimate consideration.” Id.  
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objectives.”359 With that statement, the court seemed to hold that aesthetic zoning was a proper 
exercise of the police power. By extension, it would seem that under this language, historic 
zoning was also proper given that it serves to preserve attractive characteristics of the 
community. The court ultimately noted that as it was “unable to say that requiring the appellant 
to use her property in conformance with the provisions of the zoning ordinance would not serve 
to preserve the attractive characteristics of the community and the property values therein. 
Therefore, the attack upon . . . the ordinance . . . must fail.”360 
Finally, the courts of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Mexico all followed the 
rationale presented in Berman in upholding the validity of historic zoning laws. In John Donnelly 
& Sons, Inc., the Massachusetts Supreme Court upheld the locality’s decision to deny plaintiff’s 
permit for off-premises outdoor advertising signs and explicitly concluded “that aesthetics alone 
may justify the exercise of the police power; that within the broad concept of ‘general welfare,’ 
cities and towns may enact reasonable bill-board regulations designed to preserve and improve 
their physical environment.”361 The court also directly cited language in Berman for the 
proposition “that the general welfare embraces aesthetic considerations.”362 Further, the court 
found that while Berman discussed the general welfare with reference to eminent domain, the 
same view could be applied to zoning.
363
 In making this determination, the Massachusetts court 
also cited to an Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, noting that it had previously recognized the 
tendency to give more weight to aesthetic considerations when it had generally determined 
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historic zoning to be constitutional.
364
 The court thus seemingly recognized a congruous 
relationship among eminent domain, the police power, aesthetic zoning, and historic zoning. 
Moreover, the Massachusetts Supreme Court directly recognized the constitutionality of 
historic zoning in answering questions posed by the Massachusetts Senate.
365
 In concluding that 
historic zoning was within the proper scope of the police power, the court first noted that historic 
zoning did not relate to public health, safety, or morality.
366
 Nonetheless, the court continued by 
stating that aesthetics could be given a stronger consideration in light of Berman.
367
 The court 
applied the language of Berman and reasoned that because “incongruous structures” could 
destroy the historic character of the town, the police power could be exercised to regulate for the 
preservation of the historic character.
368
 In short, the broad concept of the police power and 
general welfare adopted in Berman seemed to strongly influence the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court that historic zoning was valid. 
Likewise, in Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., the New Mexico Supreme Court held that 
an ordinance requiring a certain window size to be used for structures within a historic district 
was a valid exercise of the police power.
369
 The court discussed the two Opinions of the Justices 
to the Senate, issued by the Massachusetts Supreme Court and ultimately held that “the Santa Fe 
historical zoning ordinance [was] within the term ‘general welfare.’”370 Interestingly, the court 
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 See Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1955) (Beacon Hill 
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seemed to distinguish historic zoning from purely aesthetic zoning and thus found it unnecessary 
to determine whether aesthetic considerations alone could justify the exercise of the police 
power, as suggested by Berman.
371
 The court did, however, recognize the importance of aesthetic 
considerations to historic zoning and suggested that, because the historic ordinance in question 
had comprehensive architectural control requirements, the ordinance was not arbitrary or 
unreasonable.
372
 Therefore, while it attempted to distinguish historic and aesthetic zoning, the 
court nonetheless discussed the strong relationship between the two and ultimately upheld the 
historic ordinance in general accordance with the opinions issued by the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court, which in turn relied largely on Berman in upholding the constitutionality of historic 
zoning ordinances.
373
 
Similarly, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the validity of a local regulation 
that, in order to maintain the atmosphere of the town, prohibited the erection of structures within 
a quarter mile of the Town Common without prior approval from the town board.
374
 The 
regulation in question, therefore, was very analogous to standard historic zoning practices that 
generally require a certificate of appropriateness prior to the construction, alteration, or 
demolition of structures within certain districts.
375
 In upholding the regulations, the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of “preserving the value of the historic 
buildings about the common” was a valid basis for the exercise of the police power and “too well 
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 See id. at 17-18. 
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 Id. at 17 (“[Defendants] ignore the fact that the window pane requirement is only one 
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established to be open to question.”376 The court was hesitant to sustain the regulation solely 
upon aesthetic considerations; however it did recognizing that the preservation of the 
attractiveness of a community fell within the general welfare.
377
 It further noted that the 
regulation was not invalid because it was motivated in part by aesthetic and historic preservation 
considerations.
378
 Ultimately, the court upheld the ordinance, approvingly cited from the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court’s Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, and noted that the town 
would not be able to maintain its atmosphere if “incongruous” structures were permitted near the 
Town Common.
379
 Again, by following the rationale laid out in Opinion of the Justices to the 
Senate, the court essentially followed the rationale established in Berman. In short, a common 
nexus among cases upholding historic or aesthetic zoning regulations is that they relied on the 
broad concept of the general welfare and police power as laid out in Berman. 
E. Comparison 
Following Berman but prior to Penn Central, the high courts of Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire all began to change their opinion 
on aesthetic zoning (and by extension historic zoning) following Berman. Furthermore, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court, which did not rule on aesthetic zoning prior to Berman,
380
 upheld a 
historic zoning ordinance based on the Berman rationale. While it is perhaps improper to lay the 
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 Id. at 234. 
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 Id. at 234-35 (“The beauty of a residential neighborhood is for the comfort and 
happiness of the residents and it tends to sustain the value of property in the neighborhood. It is a 
matter of general welfare like other conditions that add to the attractiveness of a community and 
the value of residences there located.”) (“In the case before us it is unnecessary to rely solely 
upon aesthetic considerations to sustain the exercise of the power invoked. We think it 
reasonably plain that more than aesthetics is involved.”). 
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validation of historic zoning solely at the feet of Berman, the cases discussed herein clearly show 
that Berman had a strong effect on both aesthetic and historic zoning. 
The jurisprudence prior to Berman indicates that until roughly the midcentury, there was 
a strong consensus that the police power could not be used for aesthetic purposes, and by 
extension likely could not be used for solely historic zoning purposes. The only major exception 
was found in Louisiana. There, the state high court upheld what was essentially a historic zoning 
ordinance prior to Berman, noting that it tended to promote tourism in addition to protecting the 
attractiveness of the community.
381
 Nonetheless, the court seemed hesitant to declare that 
aesthetic considerations alone could justify the use of the police power.
382
 
Following Berman, however, courts began to routinely uphold aesthetic and historic 
zoning regulations. In so doing, they usually cited Berman’s determination that public welfare is 
a broad concept, that public welfare includes aesthetic values, and that the police power can be 
used “to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy.”383 As noted 
above, the courts of at least five states even went so far as to shift away from precedent prior to 
Berman and to generally adopt a broad definition of the general welfare that was inclusive of 
aesthetics and historic preservation. Even the United States Supreme Court adopted Berman’s 
language in generally recognizing the validity of historic zoning and landmark ordinances in 
Penn Central.
384
 Therein, the Court cited Berman and noted that “States and cities may enact 
land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the character and 
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desirable aesthetic features of a city.”385 The Court then recognized that the New York landmark 
ordinance was a valid exercise of the police power, similar to historic zoning, because it 
“embodie[d] a comprehensive plan to preserve structures of historic or aesthetic interest 
wherever they might be found in the city.”386 Therefore, it is safe to conclude that Berman did 
work to provide a justification for aesthetic and historic zoning.  
Although urban renewal programs had been in place for several years prior to Berman, it 
was the United States Supreme Court’s decision in that case that placed the ultimate stamp of 
legal approval on urban renewal programs. Through its holding, the Court determined that the 
use of eminent domain to condemn both blighted property and unblighted property that was 
situated within a redevelopment zone was a valid use of eminent domain.
387
 In so doing, 
however, the Court intertwined the limitations of eminent domain with those of the police 
power.
388
 The Court further determined that the police power was broad and could be used to 
provide for an aesthetically pleasing, beautiful community.
389
 Thereafter, courts adopted that 
language in upholding aesthetic and historic zoning statutes. The broad scope of the general 
welfare and the police power was used to uphold both urban renewal programs and historic 
zoning ordinances. Therefore, it would seem that there are indeed fundamental legal similarities 
between the two programs. 
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F. Further Implications 
The jurisprudential comparison between urban renewal, through Berman, and historic 
zoning has raised further interesting implications for local regulations and planning strategies 
beyond historic zoning and urban renewal. A major implication of historic zoning, and aesthetic 
zoning in general, is the tension between such regulations and the free speech provisions of the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
390
 Both zoning strategies, by nature, restrict 
property owners from freely altering the exterior of their properties. For example, under such 
regulations, an owner may be unable to commission artwork for the side of the regulated 
building without first obtaining a certificate of appropriateness from the local zoning board. 
Likewise, if a property owner wishes to express himself through erecting a structure with a 
certain architectural style or altering his existing structure to a new style, he may likewise be 
required to first seek a certificate of appropriateness. If the artwork or architectural style 
proposed by the landowner is deemed incompatible with the historic nature of the district, his 
First Amendment speech rights could be infringed.
391
  
A further implication of this jurisprudential research is the potential for comparison 
among urban renewal tactics, historic zoning, aesthetic zoning, and other zoning regulations that 
move beyond the scope of simple Euclidean zoning. Traditional Euclidean style zoning first 
arose, theoretically, to combat nuisances before they began by separating, for example, industrial 
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 U.S. CONST. amend. I (Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech”). 
391
 For a discussion of the potential for conflict between historic district ordinances and 
the First Amendment, see Binetti, supra note 91. Further research and literature review is 
necessary to identify First Amendment challenges to historic or aesthetic zoning; however, it is 
important to note that an expanding scope of the police power will necessarily cause tension with 
explicitly protected rights as jurisdictions seek to expand their regulatory sphere. 
 78 
 
from residential land uses.
392
 However, zoning for aesthetics and historic districts pushed zoning 
beyond the traditional nuisance prevention model. The analysis comparing historic zoning and 
aesthetic zoning to urban renewal can thus provide insights into other zoning methods that go 
beyond Euclidean zoning. The strongest comparison to draw is probably to form based zoning.  
Form based zoning is a zoning strategy that seeks to regulate the physical environment 
beyond simply separating land uses.
393
 Form based zoning goes further by regulating heights, 
setbacks, facades, and outdoor spaces for the sake of creating an aesthetically pleasing physical 
environment, in addition to one that is generally pedestrian friendly and human-scaled. 
Especially given the influence of new urbanism and popularity of planning for walkable, human-
scaled environments, it is important to determine how exactly the police power is being justified 
to advance these goals.  
Form based zoning is necessarily related to aesthetic zoning, and tangentially related to 
historic zoning, for example where it may be used to help recapture the historic “feel” of a given 
urban area. As with historic zoning, form based zoning has the laudable objective of creating a 
visually pleasing and pragmatic, human centered urban environment. However, to the extent that 
form based zoning is based on an expansive understanding of the police power, it is legally 
related to the unpopular urban renewal programs of the Twentieth Century. 
Finally, the expanding conception of the general welfare and the police power raises the 
threat that eminent domain could be used to condemn and transfer property in order to develop 
                                                 
392
 See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926) (noting that the 
law of nuisances can inform the proper extent of regulatory activity) (noting that the exclusion of 
industrial uses from residential zones can tend to prevent the creation of nuisances). 
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 See generally Patricia E. Salkin, Squaring the Circle on Sprawl: What More Can We 
Do? Progress Toward Sustainable Land Use in the States, 16 WIDENER L.J. 787, 833-34 (2007) 
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aesthetically pleasing, historically authentic, or walkable environments. This concern arises from 
the United States Supreme Court’s determination in Berman that the scope of eminent domain 
and the police power are essentially coterminous. As courts shift to an expansive definition of the 
general welfare and an expansive understanding of the police power, it is possible that the use of 
eminent domain could follow suit. If this is the case, cities will essentially relive urban renewal 
programs, the difference being that now they would seek to create more traditional urban 
environments rather than modern environments. Whatever the environment sought, however, the 
use of eminent domain to achieve those objectives will necessarily result in displacement of city 
residents who live in the development zones.
394
  
Moreover if, as the Berman court stated, eminent domain is merely a means to an end and 
is permissible essentially whenever police power action is permissible, the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution would effectively be dead letter. If the police power should 
continue to expand in scope to encompass more subjective regulations, such as form based 
regulations, it is only logical to deduce that the use of eminent domain could also be expanded to 
facilitate the creation of certain urban forms. Or, expanding on Justice Rehnquist’s concern in 
Penn Central,
395
 legislatures could merely require the repair or renovation of structures in 
conformance with certain urban design codes. In such an instance, results could possibly prove 
even worse than those generated by urban renewal programs. Such requirements could cause 
displacement, because, to avoid possible penalties, lower income homeowners in historic or 
urban design districts would be forced to relocate if they were unable to keep a property in good 
                                                 
394
 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court addressed an analogous situation in Kelo v. 
City of New London. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). There, the Court found that eminent domain could be 
used to condemn and transfer land to a private developer in order to generate revenue, revitalize 
the downtown, and “make the City more attractive.” See id. at 474-75. 
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repair or in compliance with form based codes. In such a situation, based on the majority holding 
in Penn Central, these dislocated individuals would possibly not even receive the compensation 
that they would have received had they been dislocated by an urban renewal project. 
Divorced from the limitations of an earlier understanding of the police power and a pre-
Berman eminent domain jurisprudence, the law making bodies of state or local governments 
could effectively exercise near total control over private property within their jurisdictions. Such 
an outcome would likely create results even more detrimental than those of mid-Twentieth 
Century urban renewal, especially given that regulating for aesthetics alone is inherently 
subjective and much less concrete than even regulating for the abatement of blight as was the 
case with urban renewal legislation. 
It is not impossible to imagine a return to such earlier jurisprudence in states that 
subsequently expanded the scope of the police power in accordance with Berman. Still, such a 
return could possibly encounter problems if these states had constitutional or statutory provisions 
specifically declaring that aesthetic or historic zoning fell within the scope of the police 
power.
396
 In such an instance, deferential courts would likely be unable to return to a pre-Berman 
scope of the police power without evidence of a conflicting constitutional or statutory provision.  
  
                                                 
396
 A comprehensive analysis of provisions declaring that historic or aesthetic zoning falls 
within the proper exercise of the police power is beyond the scope of this Thesis; however, a 
survey of those provisions could prove useful to further research in determining whether a return 
to pre-Berman jurisprudence is possible. 
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VII. POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES TO HISTORIC ZONING 
While historic zoning may seem relatively benign and have admirable objectives, this 
research has indicated that historic zoning has strong underlying legal ties to the relatively 
unpopular urban renewal programs of the Twentieth Century. A locality can choose to protect its 
historic sites or to condemn and redevelop districts; whatever the choice, however, the 
underlying authority to do so derives from an expansive scope of the police power. It is 
important to recognize that such an expansive scope may be used to either preserve or destroy, 
and that either option may result in negative consequences such as displacement in addition to 
any positive outcomes. Given that an expansive police power may be used with laudable 
intentions but result in negative outcomes, it may be wise to return to an earlier, more limited 
understanding of the power so as to avoid the potential for revival of urban renewal or further 
erosion of an owner’s security in his property.397  
If courts returned to an earlier, limited understanding of the police power, however, could 
historic structures and districts still be preserved? As many have noted, the preservation of 
historic structures does provide benefit to the community, but is it possible to capture that benefit 
without resorting to regulations that restrict owners in the use of their property and raise the 
specter of urban renewal? A few alternatives that could achieve the benefits of historic zoning 
without the negative threats are discussed below.
398
 
                                                 
397
 As noted above in Chapter Six, such a return may necessitate amendments to existing 
statutory or constitutional provisions, depending on the jurisdiction in question. See supra note 
396 and accompanying text. 
398
 These suggestions are meant only to highlight possible alternatives. Further research 
and literature review is required to determine whether these options have been extensively 
undertaken, and if so, if they have been successful. 
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A. Private Preservation 
Perhaps the simplest alternative to historic zoning is to encourage the voluntary 
preservation of historic sites by private organizations. Indeed, there is precedent for this strategy. 
Prior to the advent of historic zoning, private groups formed to protect the nation’s vulnerable 
historic sites. The earliest, and perhaps most famous, example is the Mount Vernon Ladies 
Association’s preservation of Mount Vernon. After both the Virginia and federal governments 
declined to, this wholly private organization purchased Mount Vernon in order to repair it and 
preserve it for posterity.
399
 Moreover, in the mid-Twentieth Century, the Association purchased 
lands adjacent to Mount Vernon in order to preserve in perpetuity the views from the 
plantation.
400
 A comprehensive private restoration and preservation effort was also undertaken in 
Williamsburg, Virginia by the Rockefeller Family and continuing with the non-profit Colonial 
Williamsburg Foundation.
401
 The private actors obtained title to historic sites in and around 
Williamsburg in order to restore and preserve a district that had fallen into disrepair.
402
 The 
entire site now operates as a living history museum open to the public.
403
 
A criticism of solely relying on grand private preservation efforts undertaken by 
philanthropic organizations could be that such efforts only represent the Monumentalism style of 
                                                 
399
 See Phelps, supra note 3, at 117; NORMAN TYLER ET AL., HISTORIC PRESERVATION AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ITS HISTORY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE 29-30, 60 (2d ed. 2009); Ann Pamela 
Cunningham, Phoebe Apperson Hearst, and Frances Payne Bolton, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S 
MOUNT VERNON, http://www.mountvernon.org/content/ann-pamela-cunningham-phoebe-
apperson-hearst-and-frances-payne-bolton (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).  
400
 See Pamela Cunningham, Phoebe Apperson Hearst, and Frances Payne Bolton, supra 
note 399. 
401
 See Phelps, supra note 3, at 118-19; see also The History of Colonial Williamsburg, 
COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG FOUNDATION, http://www.history.org/Foundation/cwhistory.cfm (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2014).  
402
 See The History of Colonial Williamsburg, supra note 401. 
403
 See id. 
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historic preservation. That is, only sites of great cultural or historic value are preserved, and the 
protection of general vernacular structures in old and historic districts is not ensured. Such a 
criticism would raise questions as to the nature and extent of historic preservation in general. 
This concern, however, could largely be mitigated by recognizing that private preservation need 
not rely solely on the large scale efforts by philanthropic organizations. Private preservation can 
also occur spontaneously by property owners who seek to preserve the character of their 
structures or neighborhoods, either individually or collectively. Such strategies are discussed 
below. 
B. Easements404 
An easement is a non-possessory interest in land that grants certain rights to either use or 
prohibit certain uses of the land in question. Easements were a Common Law device that 
predated organized preservation movements; however, they are applicable to preservation 
purposes. While easements exist at Common Law, many states have adopted statutes that 
specifically permit the creation of a device known generally as a conservation easement, which 
can be used to preserve historic sites or open spaces. Such easements are generally freely 
transferable and serve to restrict or prohibit alterations to land in perpetuity. The terms of 
individual easements will vary; however, they generally entitle the easement holder to review of 
plans to repair or alter structures on the encumbered land. Moreover, the easements can usually 
bring tax benefits to the individual whose land is encumbered in the form of deductions, credits, 
or abatements. 
                                                 
404
 For a more complete discussion of easements in a historic preservation context, see 
Phelps, supra note 3, at 143-48. 
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The primary benefits to historic preservation through easements are that no coercion is 
involved and the easements generate tax benefits. Land owners are essentially free to negotiate 
for the extent of the easement; however, to obtain the tax benefits, the easement must meet 
certain requirements. In the historic preservation context, an easement could be applied only to 
the façade of a historic structure, prohibiting the owner from altering the façade, but allowing 
him to freely alter the interior.
405
 
Easements, however, do present their own problems within the preservation context.
 406
 
First, the easements are usually perpetual. The easements, therefore, would bind future owners of 
the land who never negotiated for, or received direct benefit from, the easement. Second, the 
approval process for repairs or alterations could prove to be just as cumbersome under a 
conservation easement as under a traditional zoning device. This is especially true if the holder 
of the easement is either a government entity or a quasi-public entity, potentially bound by 
constitutional and statutory requirements. Third, easements are capable tools for ensuring the 
preservation of a discrete property; however, their use in protecting whole historic districts is 
limited and would involve higher transaction costs as each owner in a district would need to 
individually transfer an easement. 
A full discussion of the consequences of and strategies regarding easements is beyond the 
scope of this Thesis. Nonetheless, it is possible to imagine revisions to conservation easement 
                                                 
405
 For a discussion of the economic implications of façade easements, see Kimberly 
Winson-Gdeideman & Dawn Jourdan, Historic Façade Easements and Single-Family Home 
Value: A Case Study of Savannah, Georgia (USA), 4 INT’L J. HOUSING MARKETS & ANALYSIS 6 
(2011). 
406
 See, e.g., Benny L. Kass, Preservation Easement May Have More Teeth Than 
Government’s Historic Districts, REALTY TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013, 1:32 PM), 
http://realtytimes.com/consumeradvice/homeownersadvice1/item/26642-20131119-preservation-
easement-may-have-more-teeth-than-governments-historic-districts. 
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statutes and tax law that could serve to ameliorate these problems. First, tax rules could be 
altered to allow non-perpetual or rolling term easements to receive tax benefits. Moreover, state 
codes could be amended to specifically allow the transfer of easements to wholly private, non-
profit entities in an attempt to avoid the potential pit fall of de facto zoning presented by public 
or quasi-public ownership of easements.
407
 
C.  Voluntary Preservation Associations 
Finally, the preservation of historic structures and neighborhoods could also be 
accomplished through the use of neighborhood homeowners associations.
408
 Essentially, the 
owners of properties in a given neighborhood could freely choose to form a non-profit 
neighborhood association and agree to be bound by the restrictions, bylaws, and rulings of the 
association.
409
  
The principle is similar to that of standard homeowners associations often found in 
neighborhoods constructed by a common developer. Within the context of historic preservation, 
however, the associations could form in existing neighborhoods and serve the sole function of 
                                                 
407
 This is a simplified discussion of possible revisions to easement laws. Further research 
and literature review would be helpful in elaborating on their potential or hazards. 
408
 Phelps has discussed a similar type of alternative to historic zoning, dubbed a 
“voluntary local historic district.” See Phelps, supra note 3, at 149-52. 
409
 This suggestion raises issues regarding covenants and perhaps closely-held corporate 
membership. It is important to note that there are a variety of requirements to the validity and 
enforcement of covenants as well as to closely-held corporate formation and membership. A full 
discussion of such requirements is beyond the scope of this Thesis. The home owners’ 
association suggestion is presented here in the abstract. In a future work, further analysis 
attempting to create a solid framework for the creation of such a body would be quite useful. 
Some questions to ask are: How is membership addressed? Are property owners free to opt-out 
of the association at a later time? Will restrictions on the property run with the land and bind 
future owners, or will the restrictions be removed when the property is sold? Could there be an 
arrangement wherein the association enacts bylaws that affect properties of members, but 
members only agree to adhere to those bylaws through a separate contract on a term basis?  
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providing for the common preservation of the historical character and aesthetic of the 
neighborhood. The association would be formed by property owners within a given 
neighborhood, and would only bind those properties whose owners are association members. 
That is, all owners in a neighborhood would be free to either opt into or remain independent from 
the association’s bylaws. Precedent for such an association exists. For example, the Code of 
Texas specifically contemplates the creation of such associations, styled “historic neighborhood 
preservation associations.”410 
As with easements, the primary benefit to the voluntary preservation association 
alternative is that it enables individual property owners to freely choose whether or not to 
encumber their property with restrictions. Unlike easements, however, the creation of a 
neighborhood association responsible for historic preservation could help to enable the 
protection of whole neighborhoods rather than mere collections of discrete properties.  
The voluntary preservation association alternative also has the virtue of truly facilitating 
local, grass roots decision-making. Within the traditional historic zoning framework, 
neighborhoods and properties can generally be designated as historic and encumbered by 
regulatory requirements or process without the express consent of affected property owners.
411
 
The use of neighborhood associations, however, whose membership would be optional to each 
property owner within the neighborhood, empowers individual citizens to choose if the benefits 
of preserving historic character for their properties and their neighborhood outweigh the costs. 
Furthermore, when owners find the need to repair, rebuild, or otherwise alter their property, they 
                                                 
410
 See 11 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 208 (West 2013). 
411
 That is to say that affected residents do not typically have a ‘veto’ power over zoning 
ordinances enacted by a city council. 
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would not need to traverse the costly “red tape” of city hall.412 Rather, owners would engage 
directly with fellow neighborhood residents in seeking authority to act.
413
 
As historic preservation has laudable objectives and is fairly popular, at least in the 
abstract, there is no reason to think that property owners would summarily reject rules that 
maintained the historic character of their properties and neighborhood, especially if they had a 
strong and effective say in adoption and enforcement of the rules. Indeed, many home owners 
already agree to voluntarily accept restrictions on their property in the form of traditional 
homeowners associations. A voluntary preservation association could result in the protection of, 
or increase in, property values found with official historic designation, without an accompanying 
governmental regulatory framework.
414
 
Finally, the voluntary preservation association alternative could be combined with the use 
of conservation easements. In such a scenario, the association would not necessarily enact 
                                                 
412
 For example, in the City of Richmond, Virginia, “[a] certificate of appropriateness 
shall be required for all alterations to a building, structure, or site which is subject to a public 
view.” CITY OF RICHMOND, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES Ch. 114, § 114-930.6(f) (2014).  While 
the actual first time application for a COA does not require payment of a fee, the applicant is 
required to submit twelve physical copies of all required supporting documentation in addition to 
a digital copy. See City of Richmond Commission of Architectural Review, Application 
Submission Requirements, available at 
http://www.richmondgov.com/content/CommissionArchitecturalReview/forms/CAR_Submissio
nApplicationRequirements.pdf.  Required supporting documentation may include: site plans, 
sections, or elevations; a materials list; a colors list; and historic documentary evidence. See id. 
For a discussion on the negative effects of red tape on urbanism in general, see Andres Duany, 
The Pink Zone: Why Detroit is the New Brooklyn, CNN MONEY (Jan. 30, 2014, 10:09 PM), 
http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2014/01/30/the-pink-zone-why-detroit-is-the-new-
brooklyn/.   
413
 It is not unreasonable to conclude that individual property owners and the 
neighborhood as a whole would have more complete information than city hall, and therefore 
better decision-making capabilities, when determining what should or should not be done in their 
neighborhood. 
414
 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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restrictions to ensure the preservation of members’ historic properties. Rather, members could 
donate historic conservation easements on their property to the association. The primary benefit 
to enabling the neighborhood association to hold the easement is that the process for seeking 
permission to alter or repair a property would, theoretically, be simpler than if the easement were 
held by a public or quasi-public agency. Furthermore, as the neighborhood association would be 
the body approving the alterations or repairs, decision-making would be kept at the most local 
level, empowering residents in the process and ideally encouraging participation in the decision-
making process.
415
 
There are, however, potential downsides to the voluntary association alternative. First, 
there could be some initial difficulty in forming the association. Formation of a homeowners 
association is often undertaken at or around the time of the initial development of the 
neighborhood.
416
 Similarly, the ability of the association to provide for the preservation of the 
entire neighborhood could be thwarted by individual property owners who did not want to 
restrict their use of their property.
417
 The potential that some owners would not join the 
association, thus thwarting full comprehensive protection of the neighborhood, will always be a 
potential downside due to the voluntary nature of the association. However, direct economic 
                                                 
415
 To ensure that the residents, through the neighborhood association, are always in fact 
the individuals making the determinations, the easements could be made non-transferrable to 
third parties. 
416
 For example, when selling properties to the initial residents, the developer includes 
covenants in the deeds that provide for membership in and adherence to bylaws of a homeowners 
association. 
417
 This problem could be considered as a “free rider problem.” That is, if most of the 
neighborhood agreed to restrictions that preserved the overall historic character, a single hold out 
property owner could receive any potential benefits, such as general community attractiveness or 
even property value protection, without paying for that benefit himself by similarly agreeing to 
encumber his own property. See Phelps, supra note 3, at 149 & n.214 (noting that voluntary 
historic districts could face the classic free-rider problem). 
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incentives could be tailored to help address this problem. A possible strategy to mitigate these 
downsides could be for local governments to provide a property tax abatement or for the state 
and federal governments to provide an income tax deduction or credit for owners who join the 
association and agree to be bound by the restrictions and bylaws. Such incentives could help to 
encourage neighborhood residents to in fact form and join a neighborhood preservation 
association. 
A further potential downside to voluntary associations is the threat of existing members 
leaving the association, thereby presenting difficulties to enforcement of a common 
neighborhood preservation scheme. If an owner could simply leave the association when he 
desired to pursue an alteration or repair against the association’s common scheme, enforcement 
would be near impossible. This potential downside could, however, be addressed with traditional 
contractual obligations and remedies. Depending on the terms of the association’s articles of 
incorporation or bylaws, an injunction or other action for breach of contract could hypothetically 
be brought against the leaving member. 
While the voluntary preservation association alternative has potential downsides and will 
not be able to fully recreate the effect of historic zoning regulations, any such downsides must be 
weighed against the beneficial aspects of deregulation and voluntary preservation. The 
encouragement of private, voluntary preservation allows citizens, both individually and 
collectively through neighborhood associations, to conduct their own evaluation of the costs and 
benefits of preservation. Allowing citizens the ability to make such determinations themselves 
has the virtue of empowering individuals and neighborhoods in addition to that of encouraging 
decision-making at the most local level. 
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Keeping this decision-making power local and decentralized among the many residents 
of a neighborhood, whether individually or through collective voting through a neighborhood 
association, will also likely facilitate adaptation to the change in neighborhood conditions over 
time. Neighborhoods are organic, and a change in conditions is inevitable as residents move in or 
out, demographics shift, attitudes change, local employment opportunities rise or fall, and the 
needs and desires of residents change.  
Any wise preservation strategy should be prepared to address such a change in 
conditions. Similarly, strategies must recognize that preservation will ultimately be a multi-
generational issue as the underlying land may remain static, but residents and their desired land 
uses will not. Providing for truly local decision-making empowers those most sensitive to the 
needs and changing conditions of their community to preserve or adapt historic structures as 
necessity demands, without first seeking approval from a centralized third-party that may lack 
such sensitivity. Ultimately, the voluntary preservation association alternative protects against 
the underlying threats of urban renewal that the legal justifications for historic zoning present. It 
also, however, encourages the preservation of historic structures while providing the added 
benefit of empowering neighborhood residents to determine for themselves when changing 
conditions necessitate alteration and adaptation.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
This Thesis has attempted to demonstrate that there is a fundamental connection between 
the underlying legal principles of historic zoning and urban renewal. To that end, the 
jurisprudence involving historic zoning before and after the seminal urban renewal case of 
Berman v. Parker has been collected and analyzed. As the initial search used herein did not 
identify cases involving historic zoning prior to Berman, the search was expanded to include 
cases involving aesthetic zoning, which is closely related to historic zoning.
418
 
An analysis of the jurisprudence indicated that prior to Berman courts were more likely to 
adopt a limited view of the police power and the concept of the general welfare. Specifically, the 
high courts of fourteen of the nineteen states identified would generally strike down ordinances 
that sought to regulate solely for aesthetic purposes. In so doing courts noted that the exercise of 
the police power must relate to public health, safety, morals, or welfare. The courts recognized 
the value of aesthetics, but would not find that aesthetics alone provided a justifiable grounding 
in health, safety, morals, or welfare. Given the close relationship between aesthetic zoning and 
historic zoning, it generally seems as though courts would have also been reluctant to recognize 
zoning for purely historic purposes prior to Berman. For example, in 1949 the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts stated that “[r]egard for the preservation of the natural beauty of a neighborhood 
makes the enactment of a zoning regulation desirable but does not itself give vitality to the 
regulation.”419 
In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States issued an opinion in Berman v. Parker. 
In that case, the Court generally upheld the validity of comprehensive urban renewal programs, 
                                                 
418
 See supra Chapter III; see also supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
419
 Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 87 N.E.2d 9, 15 (Mass.1949). 
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the programs that were later recognized to have quite negative consequences.
420
 The Court 
upheld urban renewal programs by essentially determining that the power of eminent domain and 
the police power were coterminous. In making this determination, the Court also noted that the 
scope of the police power was very broad and that the concept of the public welfare 
encompassed aesthetics. Therefore, the Court stated that legislatures had the power to determine 
that their communities be beautiful as well as safe. With that language, the Court effectively 
expanded the scope of the police power. 
Thereafter, an analysis of the jurisprudence following Berman indicated that courts were 
more likely to uphold aesthetic or historic zoning ordinances. Specifically, the high courts of five 
states seemed to move away from their positions prior to Berman and instead cited Berman for 
the proposition that aesthetic and historic zoning were valid exercises of the police power. For 
example, in a 1955 opinion, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts cited Berman and noted that 
“[t]here is reason to think that more weight might now be given to aesthetic considerations than 
was given to them [in the early twentieth century].”421 It then noted that, because construction of 
“incongruous structures” could destroy the historic character of the town, historic zoning 
ordinances fell within the scope of the police power.
422
 
The research undertaken pursuant to this Thesis focused on the inquiry as to the 
jurisprudential connection between urban renewal and historic zoning. It ultimately indicated that 
there is a connection between the two programs. The cases identified by the search in this Thesis 
ultimately indicated that Berman had an impact on the acceptance of aesthetic and historic 
                                                 
420
 See supra Chapters II, IV.B. 
421
 Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557, 561 (Mass. 1955). 
422
 Id. at 562. 
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zoning. Therefore, it seems as though historic zoning and urban renewal share fundamental legal 
roots. That is, both programs are based in an expansive understanding of the police power. 
The identification, collection, and analysis of cases here, will hopefully serve future 
research by assisting in further analyzing the connections between not only historic zoning and 
urban renewal, but also among aesthetic zoning in general, form based zoning, the police power, 
eminent domain, and conflicts between zoning and the rights protected by the First 
Amendment.
423
 
Given that the legacy of urban renewal is largely negative, and that historic zoning can be 
shown to share a legal connection to urban renewal, this Thesis also broadly suggested several 
alternatives to traditional historic zoning practices. These alternatives focused on options that 
empowered individual residents and owners to personally make historic determinations for 
themselves and their neighborhoods.
424
 Under these alternative systems of preservation, the 
planner’s role becomes one of advocacy, support, and facilitation, rather than of centralized 
decision-making. Likewise, the land-use attorney’s role becomes one of crafting the legal 
protections sought by citizens and neighborhoods, without resorting to regulatory practices and 
legal theories that raise the negative threats of urban renewal. By reorienting historic 
preservation away from zoning practices based on the same legal principles that justified urban 
renewal and towards alternatives that encourage and enable both individual and collective grass 
roots decision-making, it could be possible to achieve the beneficial aspects of historic 
preservation without the threats inherent to urban renewal programs. 
                                                 
423
 See supra Chapter VI.F. 
424
 See supra Chapter VII. 
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Appendix A 
Table of Cases, decided prior to Berman v. Parker, for the nineteen states identified 
Arkansas 
 
Herring v. Stannus, 275 S.W. 321 (Ark. 1924) (“conceding - without deciding – [that the] police 
power may not be used for purely aesthetic purposes”). 
Powell v. Taylor, 263 S.W.2d 906 (Ark. 1954) (holding that funeral homes may be barred from 
residential areas because the continuous suggestion of death destroys the comfort and repose of 
home ownership). 
 
California 
 
Feraut v. City of Sacramento, 269 P. 537 (Cal. 1928) (holding that zoning ordinances must be 
based on the foundation of protecting public health, safety, morality, or welfare). 
City of Beverly Hills v. Brady, 215 P.2d 460 (Cal. 1950) (en banc) (holding that a physician did 
not violate a residential zoning ordinance by employing secretaries and publishing medical 
pamphlets in a residential zone). 
Beverly Oil Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 254 P.2d 865 (Cal. 1953) (en banc) (upholding a 
prohibition on certain expansions of an oil drilling operation by noting that oil drilling was 
specifically declared by law to be detrimental to public health, safety, and welfare). 
 
Connecticut 
 
Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 111 A. 354 (Conn.1920) (upholding setback requirements on the 
basis of public health, safety, and welfare). 
State v. Kievman, 165 A. 601 (Conn.1933) (licensing of junk yards) (“The situation presented 
does not require us to decide whether æsthetic considerations alone would be sufficient to 
warrant regulation or restriction.”). 
Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Westport, 40 A.2d 177 (Conn. 1944) (noting that aesthetics alone 
cannot serve to justify the use of the police power). 
Langbein v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 67 A.2d 5 (Conn. 1949) (certificate of occupancy to use 
property as a day school). 
Gionfriddo v. Town of Windsor, 81 A.2d 266 (Conn. 1951) (finding that aesthetics alone cannot 
justify the prohibition on the display of vehicles for sale). 
 
 
 ii 
 
Kansas 
 
Ware v. City of Wichita, 214 P. 99 (Kan. 1923) (upholding zoning ordinances providing for the 
separation of land uses, because such ordinances protect the health and safety of the public) 
(discussing the shifting nature of aesthetic regulations, but not holding that aesthetics alone can 
justify the use of the police power). 
Heckman v. City of Independence, 274 P. 732 (Kan. 1929) (upholding zoning ordinance that 
prohibited service station in residential zone). 
City of Wichita v. Schwertner, 286 P. 266 (Kan. 1930) (residential zoning of land previously 
held for use as a cemetery did not prohibit the land from being used for cemetery purposes in the 
future). 
Asmann v. Masters, 98 P.2d 419 (Kan. 1940) (finding that a dance hall is not a nuisance per se, 
but that it can become one under certain circumstances). 
 
Louisiana 
 
State ex rel Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440 (La. 1923) (upholding an ordinance that 
prohibited businesses in residential districts, because such ordinances affected public health and 
safety, in addition to aesthetics) (noting precedent that aesthetic considerations alone cannot 
justify use of the police power; however, discussing how the general welfare likely encompasses 
aesthetics). 
State ex rel Giangrosso v. City of New Orleans, 106 So. 549 (La. 1925) (upholding ordinance 
separating land uses, because it promoted public health and safety). 
State ex rel Palma v. City of New Orleans, 109 So. 916 (La. 1926) (upholding ordinance 
separating land uses, because it promoted public health and safety). 
State ex rel Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 121 So. 613 (La. 1929) (upholding ordinance 
separating land uses, because it promoted public health and safety) (holding that the continued 
operation of a business in violation of a zoning ordinance constitutes a public nuisance). 
City of New Orleans v. S. Auto Wreckers, 192 So. 523 (La. 1939) (a property use that does “not 
offend public morals or jeopardize the health and safety of the public” is legitimate). 
City of New Orleans v. Levy, 64 So.2d 798 (La. 1953) (upholding a historic zoning ordinance 
under a broad scope of public welfare, because it preserved the character of the city, thus tending 
to promote tourism) (noting, however, that aesthetics alone could not likely justify the 
ordinance).  
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
Maine 
 
Inhabitants of York Harbor Village Corp. v. Libby, 140 A. 382 (Me. 1928) (upholding zoning 
ordinance that excluded private camping grounds, because such uses tend to affect public order 
and sanitation). 
 
Maryland 
 
Cochran v. Preston, 70 A. 113 (Md.1908) (upholding maximum height restrictions, because they 
tend to protect the public from the danger of fire) (but noting that the police power cannot be 
used to impair private property rights solely for aesthetic purposes). 
Stubbs v. Scott, 95 A. 1060 (Md.1915) (city building inspector could not deny a building permit 
for a store simply because there were no other stores in the area) (recognizing that the police 
power cannot be used to merely improve the aesthetic appearance of a neighborhood). 
Byrne v. Maryland Realty Co., 98 A. 547, 549 (Md.1916) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance 
prohibiting the erection of new dwelling houses unless they are constructed as separate 
buildings) (“The act does not relate to the police power, and its enforcement would deprive the 
appellee of property rights guaranteed by the Constitution, which cannot be invaded for purely 
aesthetic purposes under the guise of the police power.”). 
Osborne v. Grauel, 110 A. 199 (Md.1920) (upholding the denial of a permit to construct a garage 
nearby to residences and recognizing that garages “increase the danger of fire”) (but noting that 
the police power cannot be used for solely aesthetic purposes). 
Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A. 50 (Md.1925) (extensively documenting the contemporary state of 
zoning law) (holding that ordinances that bear no relation to public health, safety, morals, or 
welfare are void) (holding that aesthetic concerns alone cannot justify the exercise of the police 
power and the infringement of property rights). 
R.B. Const. Co. v. Jackson, 137 A. 278 (Md.1927) (upholding zoning ordinances establishing 
setback requirements, because they tend to reduce the risk of fire and promote health). 
Nw. Merchs. Terminal v. O’Rourke, 60 A.2d 774 (Md.1948) (private action by taxpayers to 
enforce zoning ordinance with regard to neighboring property) (“In order to impose restrictions 
some valid exercise of the police power must be proven. But such power is invoked for the 
protection of the property restricted and not to give protection to surrounding property.”) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Maryland Advertising Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 86 A.2d 169 (Md.1952) (finding that a 
restriction on billboards was not related to public health, safety, morals, or welfare and, 
therefore, was arbitrary and invalid). 
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Massachusetts 
 
Welch v. Swasey, 79 N.E. 745 (Mass. 1907) (finding restrictions on maximum building heights 
valid, because they promote public safety from fire) (but noting that such ordinances cannot be 
upheld “for a mere aesthetic object”). 
In re Op. of the Justices, 127 N.E. 525 (Mass.1920) (opining that zoning on the basis of land use 
is a valid exercise of the police power to promote public health and safety) (but noting that 
aesthetic considerations alone cannot serve as the basis of the police power). 
Ayer v. Cram, 136 N.E. 338 (Mass.1922) (upholding maximum height restrictions, because they 
could diminish the risk of fire) (but noting that use of the police power cannot be based on 
aesthetic considerations alone). 
Gen. Outdoor Adver. Co. v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 193 N.E. 799 (Mass.1935) (discussing 
constitutional provision allowing regulation of billboards along public ways) (holding that such 
regulations are valid, because they “promote safety of travel upon the highways”) (aesthetic 
considerations alone do not justify use of police power). 
Town of Lexington v. Govenar, 3 N.E.2d 19 (Mass.1936) (prohibition of commercial signs in a 
residential zone) (noting that “doubtless esthetic considerations play a large part” in the 
prohibition of such advertisements; however, reaching the holding based on the separation of 
land uses and the promotion of public health, safety, and welfare). 
Town of Burlington v. Dunn, 61 N.E.2d 243 (Mass.1945) (town by law restraining the removal 
of top soil) (noting that aesthetics may be considered in conjunction with other considerations). 
122 Main St. Corp. v. City of Brockton, 84 N.E.2d 13 (Mass.1949) (“It is not within the scope of 
the act to enact zoning regulations for the purpose of assisting a municipality to retain or assume 
a general appearance deemed to be ideal, or to inflate its taxable revenue.”). 
Circle Lounge & Grill v. Bd. of Appeal, 86 N.E.2d 920 (Mass.1949) (private action to prevent 
the issuance of a permit to construct a restaurant on nearby land). 
Barney & Casey Co. v. Town of Milton, 87 N.E.2d 9 (Mass.1949) (“Regard for the preservation 
of the natural beauty of a neighborhood makes the enactment of a zoning regulation desirable but 
does not itself give vitality to the regulation.”). 
 
Michigan 
 
James S. Holden Co. v. Connor, 241 N.W. 915 (Mich. 1932) (upholding an ordinance 
establishing setbacks on public health and safety grounds) (but noting that aesthetic 
considerations alone cannot justify the police power). 
Perry Mount Park Cemetery Ass’n v. Netzel, 264 N.W. 303 (Mich.1936) (private action to 
enjoin the operation of a salvage yard on unrestricted neighboring land) (“[M]ere esthetics is 
beyond the power of the court to regulate, especially in a case like this where both parties are in 
business for profit.”). 
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Wolverine Sign Works v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 271 N.W. 823 (Mich.1937) (holding that a 
prohibition of billboards that “did not at all interfere with any highway use or view” was invalid) 
(“Esthetics may be an incident but cannot be the moving factor.”). 
Senefsky v. Lawler, 12 N.W.2d 788 (Mich.1943) (holding that minimum lot size requirements 
are invalid exercises of the police power and noting that aesthetics alone cannot serve as the 
basis of the police power). 
1426 Woodward Ave. Corp. v. Wolff, 20 N.W.2d 217 (Mich.1945) (upholding the prohibition of 
signs overhanging public rights of way) (noting that cities may choose how to regulate, improve, 
and control its streets) (distinguishing invalid regulations pertaining to signs on private property). 
Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Lambert, 24 N.W.2d 209 (Mich.1946) (holding that minimum lot size 
requirements are invalid exercises of the police power and noting that aesthetics alone cannot 
serve as the basis of the police power). 
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lot size requirements are invalid exercises of the police power and noting that aesthetics alone 
cannot serve as the basis of the police power). 
Hitchman v. Oakland Twp., 45 N.W.2d 306 (Mich.1951) (holding that minimum lot size 
requirements are invalid exercises of the police power and noting that aesthetics alone cannot 
serve as the basis of the police power). 
Foster v. Genesee Cnty., 46 N.W.2d 426 (Mich.1951) (dismissing a complaint to enjoin the 
construction of an animal shelter under the theory that it could constitute a nuisance in the 
future). 
 
Missouri 
 
City of St. Louis v. Galt, 179 Mo. 8 (Mo. 1903) (upholding an ordinance requiring the removal 
of flowers considered to be “weeds,” because weeds tend to disrupt the public health). 
City of St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 147 S.W. 998 (Mo.1910) (holding that an ordinance prohibiting 
the operation of manufacturing machinery within six hundred feet of a park was unconstitutional 
as a taking without compensation) (“[The police power] cannot sanction the confiscation of 
private property for aesthetic purposes.”). 
In re Kansas City Ordinance No. 39946, 252 S.W. 404 (Mo.1923) (en banc) (upholding an 
ordinance that regulated the construction and setback of structures, but that provided 
compensation for the ensuing diminution in value) (generally analogizing the restrictions at issue 
to height restrictions that tend to protect public safety and comfort).  
State ex rel Penrose Inv. Co. v. McKelvey, 256 S.W. 474 (Mo.1923) (en banc) (holding that 
zoning ordinances that bear no relation to public health, safety, or welfare are void and 
unconstitutional) (noting that the police power cannot be used for purely aesthetic purposes) 
(“[T]he necessity for the existence of civil government lies in the protection it affords to the 
rights of the individual.”). 
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City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, 256 S.W. 489 (Mo.1923) (en banc) (holding that zoning ordinances 
that bear no relation to public health, safety, or welfare are void and unconstitutional) (finding 
that the police power may not rest on aesthetic considerations alone).  
State ex rel Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 298 S.W. 720 (Mo.1927) (en banc) (upholding a 
zoning ordinance that segregated land uses, because it promoted public health and safety).  
Blind v. Brockman, 12 S.W.2d 742 (Mo.1928)(upholding prohibition on soft drink stands for 
public safety reasons) (distinguishing cases that involve the use of the police power for purely 
aesthetic purposes). 
City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 216 S.W.2d 475 (Mo.1948) (upholding an ordinance that 
prohibited junk yards in an industrial zone). 
Leffen v. Hurlbut-Glover Mortuary, Inc., 257 S.W.2d 609 (Mo.1953) (private action to enjoin 
operation of funeral home in allegedly residential district) (remanded to determine whether 
district was in fact zoned as business or for funeral homes). 
 
New Hampshire 
 
Sundeen v. Rogers, 141 A. 142 (N.H. 1928) (noting that aesthetics alone cannot justify the use of 
the police power, but upholding a set back ordinance on the basis of public health and safety). 
 
New Mexico 
 
Town of Gallup v. Constant, 11 P.2d 962 (N.M. 1932) (affirming the grant of an injunction to 
restrain construction and compel removal of wooden structures within fire limits) (ordinance 
upheld on public safety grounds). 
 
New York 
 
Wulfsohn v. Burden, 150 N.E. 120 (N.Y. 1925) (upholding ordinances establishing setbacks and 
maximum heights on public health and safety grounds) (noting that aesthetics may be considered 
as auxiliary to more sufficient justifications for police power activity). 
Eaton v. Sweeny, 177 N.E. 412 (N.Y. 1931) (the burdens of zoning “must be equally 
distributed”) (city cannot use zoning to beautify property adjacent to a park if such zoning 
renders property valueless). 
Dowsey v. Vill. of Kensington, 177 N.E. 427 (N.Y. 1931) (declaring invalid an ordinance 
eneacted with apparently the sole objective of beautifying the village frontage). 
Perlmutter v. Greene, 182 N.E. 5 (N.Y. 1932) (upholding the administrative act of a state officer 
regarding the construction of a highway that blocked the view of certain billboards) 
(distinguishing laws that regulate billboards on private property). 
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Mid-State Adver. Corp. v. Bond, 8 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1937) (noting that an ordinance prohibiting 
the construction of off-site advertising billboards anywhere within city limits was void) (the 
court did not decide this case on aesthetic grounds). 
Baddour v. City of Long Beach, 18 N.E.2d 18 (N.Y. 1938) (upholding ordinance that divided 
land uses by prohibiting boarding house in single family residential zone ) (noting that 
ordinances compelling obedience to restrictive covenants in deeds are valid, even if they involve 
incidental aesthetic considerations) (noting that aesthetic considerations are not “wholly without 
weight”). 
 
North Carolina 
 
Turner v. City of New Bern, 122 S.E. 469 (N.C. 1924) (holding that the police power can be 
used to prohibit the operation of certain businesses in certain districts) (noting that a locality 
cannot use the police power for purely aesthetic purposes without paying just compensation). 
MacRae v. City of Fayetteville, 150 S.E. 810 (N.C. 1929) (“[A gasoline station] might be to 
some an ‘eyesore,’ but the law does not allow aesthetic taste to control private property, under 
the guide of police power.”). 
Town of Wake Forest v. Medlin, 154 S.E. 29 (N.C. 1930) (finding that a filling station may be 
prohibited in residential zones, because of the “possibility of public injury”). 
Appeal of Parker, 197 S.E. 706 (N.C. 1938) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting walls along the 
street line on the basis of public safety). 
 
Pennsylvania 
 
Appeal of White, 134 A. 409 (Pa. 1926) (holding that certain setback requirements were invalid, 
because they were unrelated to public safety, health, morals, or general welfare) (“[Regulation of 
private property] must not be from an arbitrary desire to resist the natural operation of economic 
laws or for purely aesthetic considerations.”).  
Appeal of Ward, 137 A. 630 (Pa.1927) (upholding zoning ordinance providing for the separation 
of business and residential uses). 
Appeal of Ligget, 139 A. 619 (Pa.1927) (upholding the exclusion of advertising signboards from 
residential districts) (but noting that zoning regulations cannot be justified by solely aesthetic 
considerations) (but noting that zoning may not be sustained on aesthetic considerations alone). 
Appeal of Kerr, 144 A. 81 (Pa.1928) (upholding setback restrictions related to public health, 
safety, morals, or welfare). 
Walnut & Quince Streets Corp. v. Mills, 154 A. 29 (Pa.1931) (finding that a city may use 
aesthetic considerations in municipal control over public property) (analogizing the municipal 
determination of what signs private parties may place on public property to the municipal choice 
of what trees to plant in public parks). 
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Walker v. Delaware Cnty. Trust Co., 171 A. 458 (Pa.1934) (denying an injunction to prohibit the 
operation of a gas station in a commercial zone, because the use does not constitute a nuisance).  
Petition of Standard Investments Corp., 19 A.2d 167 (Pa.1941) (finding that to be valid 
ordinances must not be based arbitrarily on aesthetic considerations). 
Overbrook Farms Club v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 40 A.2d 423 (Pa.1945) (upholding the 
grant of a permit to operate a rabbi’s office and synagogue in a residential zone that also 
expressly allowed the operation of church and church offices). 
Application of Devereux Foundation, 41 A.2d 744 (Pa.1945) (overturning a variance to operate a 
home for mentally deficient children in a residential zone, because petitioner did not provide 
enough evidence to support the grant of a variance). 
Belovsky v. Redevelopment Auth., 54 A.2d 277 (Pa.1947) (upholding redevelopment law that 
allowed private parties to invest in public projects in redevelopment areas acquired by eminent 
domain) (noting in passing that “aesthetic objectives are not sufficient to justify the exercise of 
the power of eminent domain”). 
Appeal of Crawford, 57 A.2d 862 (Pa.1948) (Board of Adjustment abused discretion by refusing 
to grant variance for setback requirements). 
Katzman v. Anderson, 59 A.2d 85 (Pa.1948) (refusing to enforce a deed restriction that had 
become impractical due to changing conditions). 
Appeal of Lord, 81 A.2d 533 (Pa.1951) (declaring that a zoning board may not deny a permit 
simply because it finds the intended use to be unaesthetic). 
Appeal of Medinger, 104 A.2d 118 (Pa.1954) (declaring that aesthetic reasons alone cannot 
justify use of the police power and invalidating an ordinance establishing minimum lot sizes). 
La Rue v. Weiser, 106 A.2d 447 (Pa.1954) (refusing to enforce a sixty-three year old deed 
restriction that had become impractical due to changed neighborhood conditions). 
Silverco, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 109 A.2d 147 (Pa.1954) (upholding denial of 
variance to operate live cattle and hide storage business in an industrial district, because 
petitioner did not sustain his burden of evidence). 
 
Rhode Island 
 
City of Providence v. Stephens, 133 A. 614 (R.I. 1926) (finding that apartment homes may be 
excluded from a residential district on the grounds that the exclusion would promote public 
health and safety by lessening the risks of fire and congestion) (but noting that the police power 
cannot be based on purely aesthetic considerations). 
Sundlun v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 145 A. 451 (R.I.1929) (finding that a city acted improperly in 
denying a permit to erect a filling station in a residential district, because the record did not 
indicate that the station was a threat to public health or safety) (noting that mere aesthetic 
objections to the station could not justify denial of the permit). 
Prata Undertaking Co. v. State Bd. of Embalming & Funeral Directing, 182 A. 808 (R.I. 1936) 
(statute setting requirements for licensure of undertaking businesses). 
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Nutini v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 82 A.2d 883 (R.I.1951) (affirming action of zoning board 
granting permit to operate a dental office in a residential zone). 
 
Vermont 
 
Vermont Salvage Corp. v. Vill. of St. Johnsbury, 34 A.2d 188 (Vt. 1943) (finding that zoning 
ordinances could not be used to prohibit the operation of junk yards for purely aesthetic reasons). 
 
Virginia 
 
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 67 S.E. 376 (Va. 1910) (finding that setback requirements are not 
unconstitutional, because they serve “the interest of public health, public morals, and public 
safety”). 
Gorieb v. Fox, 134 S.E. 914 (Va.1926) (noting the unsettled extent of the police power) (finding 
that ordinances separating land use and establishing setbacks are valid “if passed in the interest 
of the health, safety, comfort, or convenience of the public, or for the promotion of the public 
welfare, when not unreasonable”). 
Martin v. City of Danville, 138 S.E. 629 (Va.1927) (upholding an ordinance regulating the 
location of filling stations) (displaying deference to legislative determinations and noting that 
because the ordinance was not “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation 
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare,” it was not unconstitutional). 
West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 192 S.E. 881 (Va.1937) (upholding a prohibition on 
brick plants in a residential district, but noting that aesthetic considerations alone cannot justify 
use of the police power). 
City of Alexandria v. Texas Co., 1 S.E.2d 296 (Va.1939) (holding that ordinances must relate to 
public health, safety, morals, or welfare). 
 
Washington 
 
State ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 256 P. 781 (Wash. 1927) (upholding single family 
residential districts that only allow construction of philanthropic homes for children or the 
elderly when two thrids of nearby property owners consent). 
King Cnty. v. Lunn, 200 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1948) (injunction to prohibit individual form operating 
a restaurant out of his home in a residential district). 
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Summary 
 
State High Court Based on the cases identified, prior to Berman, could aesthetics alone serve 
as the justification for exercise of the police power? 
Arkansas No 
California No 
Connecticut No 
Kansas No 
Louisiana Probably not, however, economic considerations together with a preservation 
objective would likely have been valid  
Maine - 
Maryland No 
Massachusetts No 
Michigan No 
Missouri No 
New Hampshire No 
New Mexico - 
New York No 
North Carolina No 
Pennsylvania No 
Rhode Island No 
Vermont No 
Virginia No 
Washington - 
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Appendix B 
Table of Cases, decided after Berman v. Parker but before Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
City of New York, for the nineteen states identified 
 
Arkansas 
 
Yarbrough v. Arkansas State Highway Comm’n, 539 S.W.2d 419 (Ark. 1976) (delegation of 
authority to State Highway Commission to enter into agreements with the United States 
Secretary of Transportation). 
Quapaw Quarter Ass'n Inc. v. City of Little Rock Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 546 S.W.2d 427 
(Ark. 1977) (holding that a city ordinance could not be repealed or altered by a resolution). 
 
California 
 
Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm’n, 529 P.2d 1017 (Cal. 1975) (en banc) (application 
of the California Environmental Quality Act to the annexation of land to the locality). 
Urban Renewal Agency v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 542 P.2d 645 (Cal. 
1975) (en banc) (exemption of locality from the requirements of the Coastal Zone Conservation 
Act). 
 
Connecticut 
 
City of New Haven v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 345 A.2d 563 (Conn. 1974) (standing to appeal 
Public Utilities Commission’s authorization for constructing overhead power lines). 
Figarsky v. Historic Dist. Comm’n, 368 A.2d 163 (Conn. 1976) (finding that “public welfare” 
includes the preservation of historic areas). 
 
Kansas 
 
Bd. of Park Comm’rs v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 480 P.2d 81 (Kan. 1971) (exemption of certain 
city property from ad valorem taxes by county). 
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Louisiana 
 
Probst v. City of New Orleans, 337 So.2d 1081 (La. 1976) (suit to recover ad valorem taxes paid 
under protest due to contested assessments). 
 
Maine 
 
Thomas v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 381 A.2d 643 (Me. 1978) (vested rights in a rezoning case). 
 
Maryland 
 
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 253 A.2d 883 (Md. 1969) (sufficiency of evidence needed to 
grant a special exception to a county zoning ordinance). 
People’s Counsel, Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 270 A.2d 105 (Md.1970) 
(necessity to obtain a certificate from the Public Service Commission prior to constructing an 
generating station). 
City of Baltimore v. Charles Center Parking, Inc., 271 A.2d 144 (Md.1970) (noting that 
aesthetics alone could not justify the use of the police power to restrict the erection of billboards 
or painted signs). 
Mayor of Balitmore v. Mano Swartz, Inc., 299 A.2d 828 (Md.1973) (“[T]he police power may 
rightly be exercised to preserve an area which is generally regarded by the public to be pleasing 
to the eye or historically or architecturally significant.”). 
Trainer v. Lipchin, 309 A.2d 471 (Md.1973) (finding that rezoning was not available for a 
petitioner who was not deprived of all reasonable use of his property as presently zoned). 
Mayor of Annapolis v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 316 A.2d 807 (Md.1974) (city sought to enjoin 
county from demolishing county structure located in historic district). 
 
Massachusetts 
 
Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 557 (Mass. 1955) (finding that the police power 
could be used to preserve historic districts). 
Op. of the Justices to the Senate, 128 N.E.2d 563 (Mass. 1955) (finding that the police power 
could be used to preserve historic districts). 
Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination v. Colangelo, 182 N.E.2d 595 (Mass.1962) 
(discriminatory rental practices). 
McNeely v. Bd. of Appeal, 261 N.E.2d 336 (Mass.1970) (sufficiency of evidence to grant a 
variance). 
 xiii 
 
John Donnelly & Sons, Inc. v. Outdoor Adver. Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709 (Mass.1975)(declaring that 
the general welfare includes aesthetic considerations). 
Gumley v. Bd. of Selectmen, 358 N.E.2d 1011 (Mass.1977) (discussing the considerations and 
procedures that a historic district commission must follow when issuing a certificate of 
appropriateness) (case does not involve a challenge to the historic zoning ordinance). 
Island Props., Inc. v. Martha’s Vineyard Comm’n, 361 N.E.2d 385 (Mass.1977) (application of 
regulatory controls in land and water protection act to subdivision plans previously approved). 
 
Michigan 
 
Petition of Highway US-24, in Bloomfield Twp., Oakland Cnty., 220 N.W.2d 416 (Mich. 1974) 
(highway condemnation proceeding). 
Sabo v. Twp. of Monroe, 232 N.W.2d 584 (Mich. 1975) (finding that the construction of a 
mobile-home park on residentially zoned land was reasonable) (finding that otherwise valid 
zoning regulations are not invalid because they were enacted prior to the adoption of a master 
plan). 
 
Missouri 
 
City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969) (upholding a zoning ordinance that 
served to preserve the character and distinction of a neighborhood, but that provided 
compensation for the ensuing diminution in value). 
  
New Hampshire 
 
Town of Deering ex rel Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 202 A.2d 232 (N.H. 1964) (holding that 
historic zoning is within the scope of the police power). 
 
New Mexico 
 
City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13 (N.M. 1964) (holding that historic zoning 
is within the scope of the police power). 
 
 
 
 
 xiv 
 
New York 
 
Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 316 N.E.2d 305 (N.Y. 1955) (finding that the 
denial of all economically viable use of a property constitutes a taking). 
Conley v. Town of Brookhaven Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 353 N.E.2d 594 (N.Y. 1976) (upholding 
the issuance of a variance to subdivide a parcel). 
Charles v. Diamond, 360 N.E.2d 1295 (N.Y. 1977) (action against city and state officials to issue 
permits to develop sewer system and connections). 
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. 1977) (upholding the 
New York Landmark Ordinance). 
 
North Carolina 
 
Allred v. City of Raleigh, 178 S.E.2d 432 (N.C. 1971) (holding that rezoning is not valid when it 
is based only on “special arrangements” with the owner of a particular parcel). 
 
Pennsylvania 
 
Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Pittsburgh, 141 A.2d 606 (Pa. 1958) (noting that a 
community can regulate property to create a more attractive environment). 
Nat’l Land & Inv.Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965) (noting that aesthetics alone cannot 
justify the use of the police power). 
Shapp v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973) (noting that a new 
state constitutional provision granted Pennsylvania the authority “to act in areas of purely 
aesthetic or historical concern). 
 
Rhode Island 
 
Hayes v. Smith, 167 A.2d 546 (R.I. 1961) (finding that the zoning board of review was justified 
in reversing a decision of the historic district commission) (case does not involve a challenge to 
the historic zoning ordinance). 
Op. to the House of Representatives, 208 A.2d 126 (R.I. 1965) (finding that a statute delegating 
authority to provide for historic zoning is likely constitutional). This opinion did not contain a 
discussion as to why the statute was constitutional, because the court determined that it did not 
have authority to issue an advisory opinion on this matter. See id. 
Boggs v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 264 A.2d 923 (R.I. 1970) (discussing procedural, 
advertisement, and notice requirements for appeals taken to the zoning board of review). 
 xv 
 
Corrado v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, 370 A.2d 226 (R.I. 1977) (discussing the 
procedural and appraisal aspects of condemnation). 
 
Vermont 
 
In re Barker Sargent Corp., 313 A.2d 669 (Vt. 1973) (finding that a sanitary landfill would not 
result in pollution in violation of environmental law). 
 
Virginia 
 
Bd. of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 S.E.2d 199, 213 (Va. 1975) (invalidating certain architectural 
design review regulations) (finding that a locality cannot use the police power fore solely 
aesthetic considerations) (recognizing that the Virginia Code did authorize certain localities to 
adopt historic districts under certain restrictions). 
Virginia Historic Landmarks Comm’n v. Bd. of Supervisors, 230 S.E.2d 449 (Va. 1976) (finding 
that the State Historic Landmark Commission’s designation of a historic district for the Virginia 
Landmarks Register was not subject to judicial review). 
 
Washington 
 
Leschi Imp. Council v. Washington State Highway Comm’n, 525 P.2d 774 (Wash. 1974) (en 
banc) (environmental impact of highways).  
Swift v. Island Cnty., 552 P.2d 175 (Wash. 1976) (environmental impact of subdivision 
development). 
Dep’t of Ecology v. Pacesetter Constr. Co., Inc., 571 P.2d 196 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (finding, 
in an environmental law context, that the police power can be used to protect aesthetics when it 
also served to protect against economic loss).  
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Summary 
 
State High Court Based on the cases identified, following Berman, could aesthetics or historic 
concerns alone serve as the justification for exercise of the police power? 
Arkansas - 
California - 
Connecticut Passed on the issue of solely aesthetic regulations, but upheld the validity of 
a historic district ordinance and recognized a broad scope of the general 
welfare 
Kansas - 
Louisiana - 
Maine - 
Maryland Where regulations sought to create aesthetically pleasing results, rather than 
to preserve or protect something which is aesthetically pleasing, the 
regulations will be invalid. 
Massachusetts Yes 
Michigan - 
Missouri - 
New Hampshire Yes 
New Mexico Yes 
New York Passed on the issue of aesthetics, because the primary issue in the case was 
as applied confiscatory takings; however, the dissent discussed how it may 
be appropriate to adopt the position that aesthetics alone is enough 
North Carolina - 
Pennsylvania Strongly mixed decisions recognizing the validity of aesthetic and historic 
zoning, but still holding that aesthetics alone cannot justify use of the police 
power 
Rhode Island - 
Vermont - 
Virginia No, aesthetics alone are not enough; however, the court noted that design 
regulations would have been valid if they were in compliance with the Code 
of Virginia 
Washington Aesthetics considerations will suffice if the ordinance also protects against 
economic loss 
 
  
 xvii 
 
Appendix C 
Secondary Sources 
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social Obligation of Norm in American Property Law, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009). 
Charlotte Allen, ‘Kelo’ Revisited, WEEKLY STANDARD, Feb. 10, 2014. 
ERIC W. ALLISON & LAUREN PETERS, HISTORIC PRESERVATION AND THE LIVABLE CITY 
(2011). 
ALAN A. ALTSHULER & DAVID LUBEROFF, MEGAPROJECTS: THE CHANGING POLITICS OF 
URBAN PUBLIC INVESTMENT (2003). 
D. Benjamin Barros, Nothing “Errant” About it: The Berman and Midkiff Conference 
Notes and How the Supreme Court got to Kelo With its Eyes Wide Open, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND EMINENT DOMAIN 57(Robin Paul Malloy, ed. 2008). 
Eugenie Ladner Birch & Douglad Roby, The Planner and the Preservationist: An Uneasy 
Alliance, 50 J. AM. PLAN. ASSOC. 194 (1984). 
MICAHEL P. BROOKS, PLANNING THEORY FOR PRACTITIONERS (AICP 2003). 
J. Peter Byrne, Historic Preservation and its Cultured Despisers: Reflections on the 
Contemporary Role of Preservation Law in Urban Development, 19 GEO. MASON LAW REV. 665 
(2012). 
J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405 (2003). 
Timothy L. Binetti, note, Culture Club or the Clash? Historic Preservation, Aesthetic 
Uniformity and Artistic Freedom, 13 DEPEAL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 313 (2003). 
Carol Clark, Albert S. Bard and the Origin of Historic Preservation in New York State, 18 
WIDENER L. REV. 323 (2012). 
Andres Duany, The Pink Zone: Why Detroit is the New Brooklyn, CNN MONEY (Jan. 30, 
2014, 10:09 PM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2014/01/30/the-pink-zone-why-detroit-
is-the-new-brooklyn/. 
Kimberly Winson-Gdeideman & Dawn Jourdan, Historic Façade Easements and Single-
Family Home Value: A Case Study of Savannah, Georgia (USA), 4 INT’L J. HOUSING MARKETS 
& ANALYSIS 6 (2011). 
Frank B. Gilbert, Precedents for the Future, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1971). 
Eleanor Gorski, Regulating New Construction in Historic Districts: Contemporary 
Design, The ALLIANCE REVIEW, March/April 2011, at 17-18. 
Ryan Howell, note, Throw the “Bums” Out? A Discussion of the Effects of Historic 
Preservation Statutes on Low-Income Households Through the Process of Urban Gentrification 
in Old Neighborhoods, 11 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 541 (2008). 
Terry C. Hutchinson & Nigel Duncan, Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal 
Legal Research, 17 DEAKIN L. REV. 83 (2012). 
 xviii 
 
Harvey M. Jacobs & Kurt Paulsen, Property Rights The Neglected Theme of 20th-
Century Planning, 75 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 134 (2009). 
Quintin Johnstone, Federal Urban Renewal Program, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 301 (1958). 
Benny L. Kass, Preservation Easement May Have More Teeth Than Government’s 
Historic Districts, REALTY TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013, 1:32 PM), 
http://realtytimes.com/consumeradvice/homeownersadvice1/item/26642-20131119-preservation-
easement-may-have-more-teeth-than-governments-historic-districts. 
John King, Re-evaluating S.F. Historic Preservation Framework, SFGATE (May 1, 2011, 
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/place/article/Re-evaluating-S-F-historic-preservation-
framework-2373053.php. 
Eugenie Ladner Birch & Douglad Roby, The Planner and the Preservationist: An Uneasy 
Alliance, 50 J. AM. PLAN. ASSOC. 194 (1984). 
Mark Lamster, Modernist Masterwork Demolished in Fort Worth, GUIDELIVE, THE 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS (June 22, 2013, 1:19 PM), 
http://artsblog.dallasnews.com/2013/06/modernist-masterwork-demolished-in-fort-worth.html/. 
Amy Lavine, Urban Renewal and the Story of Berman v. Parker, 42 URB. LAW. 423 
(2010). 
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The “Conservation Game”: The Possibility of Voluntary 
Cooperation in Preserving Buildings of Cultural Importance, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 733 
(1997). 
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW (5th ed. 2003). 
MIKE MCCONVILLE & WING HONG CHUI, RESEARCH METHODS FOR LAW (2007). 
MARTHA MINOW, ARCETYPAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP – A FIELD GUIDE, in AALS 
WORKSHOP FOR NEW LAW TEACHERS (AALS, 2006), available at 
http://www.aals.org/documents/2006nlt/nltworkbook06.pdf. 
NAT’L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION, THE GREENEST BUILDING: QUANTIFYING THE 
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUE OF BUILDING REUSE (2011). 
Note, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property, 63 
COLUM. L. REV. 708(1963). 
Pamela Cunningham, Phoebe Apperson Hearst, and Frances Payne Bolton, GEORGE 
WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON, http://www.mountvernon.org/content/ann-pamela-
cunningham-phoebe-apperson-hearst-and-frances-payne-bolton (last visited Apr. 28, 2014). 
David Payne, Charleston Contradictions: A Case Study of Historic Preservation Theories 
and Policies (Jan. 1, 2013) (Ph.d. dissertation, Clemson University), available at 
http://tigerprints.clemson.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2140&context=all_dissertations. 
Robin Pogrebin, Preservationists See Through Bulldozers Charging Through a Loophole, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2008, at C1. 
Wendell E. Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private 
Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE LAW & POL’Y REV. 1 (2003). 
 xix 
 
Jess R. Phelps, Moving Beyond Preservation Paralysis? Evaluating Post-Regulatory 
Alternatives for Twenty-First Century Preservation, 37 VT. L. REV. 113 (2012). 
Eric J. Remington, Do Subjective Preservation Standards Trump Objective Zoning 
Standards?, 7 LAND USE Q. 7 (2012). 
Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic 
Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1981). 
Stephanie R. Ryberg, Historic Preservation’s Urban Renewal Roots: Preservation and 
Planning in Midcentury Pennsylvania, 39 J. URBAN HISTORY 193 (2013). 
Donovan D. Rypkema, Historic Preservation and Affordable Housing: The Missed 
Connection (2002). 
Donovan D. Rypkema, The (Economic Value) of National Register Listing, 25 CULTURAL 
RESOURCE MGMT. 6 (2002). 
Patricia E. Salkin, Squaring the Circle on Sprawl: What More Can We Do? Progress 
Toward Sustainable Land Use in the States, 16 WIDENER L.J. 787 (2007). 
JAMES ROBERT SAUNDERS & RENAE NADINE SHACKLEFORD, URBAN RENEWAL AND THE 
END OF BLACK CULTURE IN CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA (2005). 
Stacey A. Sutton, Urban Revitalization in the United States: Policies and Practices, 
UNITED STATES URBAN REVITALIZATION RESEARCH PROJECT (2008). 
Jon C. Teaford, Urban Renewal and Its Aftermath, 11 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 443 
(2000). 
The History of Colonial Williamsburg, COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG FOUNDATION, 
http://www.history.org/Foundation/cwhistory.cfm (last visited Apr. 28, 2014). 
Alec Torres, Nine Years after Kelo, the Seized Land is Empty, NATIONAL REVIEW (Feb. 
5, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/370441/nine-years-after-kelo-seized-
land-empty-alec-torres.  
NORMAN TYLER ET AL., HISTORIC PRESERVATION AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS HISTORY, 
PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2009). 
U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, WITH 
HERITAGE SO RICH (1966). 
Julie Van Camp, Aesthetics and the law of Historic Preservation, presented to the 
American Society for Aesthetics (October 23, 1980), available at 
http://csulb.edu/`jvancamp/ASA_1980.pdf.  
 
